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ABSTRACT 
Over the course of several years, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has worked diligently to improve the quality of its leaders. Such efforts have 
focused almost exclusively on initiating or expanding programs related to leadership 
development. To date, the impact of that exertion might be charitably described as 
tepid. While the issues associated with existing leaders have received ample attention, 
the selection process that precipitated them has not. This gap represents an opportunity 
to explore a nascent space and suggest new solutions that target the problem at the 
source. This thesis examines the process of leadership selection at a network level and 
finds several systemic problems related to measurement, structure, and decision-
making. These problems bear a striking resemblance to those observed in the 
intelligence community and its ability to accurately predict complex future geopolitical 
events. One method that has dramatically improved the accuracy of geopolitical 
predictions is superforecasting. At its core, leadership selection is a prediction or a 
forecast. It is an educated but nonetheless imperfect best guess about how a 
candidate observed today will perform tomorrow. These features collectively suggest 
a novel question. Could DHS use a superforecasting methodology to improve its 
leadership selection process? This thesis follows the progression of that question to 
an unexpected destination and offers several concrete recommendations. 
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…Not all those who wander are lost1 
—Author J.R.R. Tolkien 
 
One of the most enduring criticisms leveled at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) over the years has been the performance of its leaders. DHS has responded 
to those criticisms by initiating or expanding programs intended to improve leadership at 
all levels by focusing on the development of existing leaders. Although these measures 
have resulted in marginal improvements in some sub-components, DHS remains 
entrenched in the bottom tier of every government scale of organizational health, a position 
it has maintained since 2010. While the issues associated with existing leaders have 
received ample attention, the selection process that precipitated them has not. This gap 
represents an opportunity to explore a nascent space and suggest new solutions to target 
the problem at its source.  
The DHS leadership selection process relies on candidate storytelling and the 
ability of experts to intuit the best candidate for a leadership position when they see one. 
The data to support the belief that experts can intuitively identify leaders is, quite simply, 
not good. The DHS selection process also fails to measurably correlate predictions with 
outcomes. In other words, after a promotion decision is made, no one can answer a simple 
yet vital question: Was that a good decision? Without an objectively accurate answer, 
officials cannot assess the performance of the selection process to identify errors, make 
corrections, and produce better subsequent outcomes. Systems that do not objectively 
compare expected outcomes against actual outcomes are open data loops. They do not 
produce good outcomes.  
In 2011, in response to a string of catastrophic intelligence failures, the U.S. 
intelligence community (IC) launched a multi-year public forecasting tournament designed 
to discover better methods for predicting complex future geopolitical events. The winning 
                                                 
1 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), 231. 
xii 
team was led by social researcher Philip Tetlock, and the revolutionary method Tetlock 
created to beat the competition was superforecasting.  
So, DHS has a leadership problem and the IC has an analysis problem. At its core, 
leadership selection is really just a prediction, or a forecast. It is an educated but 
nonetheless imperfect best guess about how a candidate observed today will perform 
tomorrow. That shared characteristic, as well as the causal overlaps for the fundamental 
flaws observed in both domains, suggest a novel possibility. Could DHS use a 
superforecasting methodology to improve its leadership selection predictions in the same 
manner that Tetlock used it to improve geopolitical predictions?  
The answer to that question resides within the thesis. The first chapter contains the 
problem statement, scope, methodology and assumptions, as well as a comprehensive 
literature review covering cognitive bias, leadership, and superforecasting. In Chapter II, 
the literatures are used to disassemble Tetlock’s superforecasting process into its 
constituent parts, and place each piece under a microscope to blueprint foundations, form, 
and function in detail. What is it, where did it originate, how does it work, why does it 
work, and what is its role in relation to the other parts in the cycle of operation? The parts 
are then virtually re-assembled and animated to help the reader visualize the entire process, 
understand where the data originates, how it is processed and measured, and how feedback 
is used to refine performance. Chapter III uses the knowledge gained to envision a new 
Superforecasting process, purpose-built for promotion, and installed in the most 
advantageous environment imaginable to test the writer’s belief that it might work, even if 
only under optimal conditions. Chapter IV assumes a Red Team role and searches for logic 
gaps or other vulnerabilities in the hypothesis to invalidate the concept. Chapter V recounts 
the journey to an unexpected conclusion, the insights gained along the way, and 
opportunities for the next expedition. Ultimately, this thesis identifies systemic flaws in the 
DHS leadership selection process, and offers several concrete recommendations that can 
be implemented to produce better organizational outcomes. It also lays a crumb trail for 
others to follow, and potentially build upon. 
Within the confines of a conventional thesis, the purpose of an Executive Summary 
is to provide the reader with a standalone version that condenses the larger document into 
xiii 
a convenient travel-sized package. This is not a conventional thesis. This is a thought 
experiment. It is designed to allow the reader to experience the progression of the question 
through the writer’s eyes, stumbles and blunders included. A more complete synopsis 
would spoil the expedition.  
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. FRAMING THE QUESTION: ADMIRAL NELSON, GENERAL 
MCCHRYSTAL, AND THE FRUSTRATING GAP 
In Team of Teams, General Stanley McChrystal chronicled the encouragement and 
inspiration he drew from Nelson’s improbable defeat of Napoleon’s overwhelmingly 
superior armada.1 Nelson’s gambit consisted of abandoning traditional naval doctrine and 
its dependency on linear orders radiating from the Admiral to the Captain of each ship of 
the fleet during battle.2 Receiving and relaying those orders had historically required ships 
to fight in a straight line to maintain sight of one another. In lieu of that structure, Nelson 
empowered his captains to act autonomously, and bring the fight to the enemy as each 
thought best. This strategy allowed Nelson to drive his ships between Napoleon’s 
traditionally arrayed fleet, thereby interrupting their own command lines and capitalizing 
on the ensuing chaos. When the acrid plumes were blown away, Britain’s bloody fleet 
stood victorious. The gambit worked. 
In analyzing Nelson’s success, McChrystal suggests that its central theme is 
historically misunderstood. Many believe it highlights the virtue of deceit and surprise in 
combat. The true significance, McChrystal asserts, was Nelson’s appreciation of “an 
organizational culture that rewarded individual initiative and critical thinking, as opposed 
to simple execution of commands.”3 Nelson’s Captains did not magically emerge the day 
before the battle. They were the product of a clear understanding of the pivotal role they 
would one day play, and a careful process reflecting that understanding, which began years 
before the battle. 
While leading the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the fight against 
Al Qaida, McChrystal found himself looking across the battlefield through Napoleon’s 
                                                 
1 Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, 1st ed. 
(New York: Portfolio, 2015), 28–31. 
2 Adam Nicolson, Seize the Fire: Heroism, Duty, and Nelson’s Battle of Trafalgar (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2006). 
3 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 31. 
2 
eyes. JSOC had tremendous technological and personnel advantages over the enemy. Yet 
McChrystal’s team had failed to gain traction in the conflict because they were dependent 
upon a top-down leadership structure that favored predictability over adaptability. Al Qaida 
was confoundingly unpredictable. McChrystal responded by transforming his organization 
and re-envisioning the role of leadership to foster the holistic knowledge and trust required 
to facilitate delegated ground-up decision making in response to a complex environment. 
The stories of Nelson and McChrystal contain many similarities. Both identify good 
leaders as the lynchpins upon which organizational success depends. Both likewise 
demonstrate the benefits of tailoring leadership structures and roles to achieve an 
organization’s goals. However, both narratives frustratingly fail to ask and answer one 
intrinsic question. How do you actually go about selecting those leaders in the first place? 
What would have happened on October 20, 1805, if Nelson had stood upon the dais and 
asked for volunteers to captain his ships, then facing the crowd of sailors with upraised 
hands, reached into his pocket and fished out a quarter? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One of the most enduring criticisms leveled at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) over the years has been the performance of its leaders, and the data 
supporting those criticisms is compelling. The most frequently cited indication of 
dysfunction originates from the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), conducted 
annually by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Since 2002, OPM has 
administered the survey to both full- and part-time federal employees at every level of 
government to measure their “perceptions of whether, and to what extent, conditions 
characteristic of successful organizations are present in their agencies.”4 FEVS is the 
primary instrument used by the government to measure organizational performance, 
identify problems, and track outcomes. It is designed using “well-established survey 
methods that meet the highest professional standards” and produces data with a one-percent 
                                                 
4 “About the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, accessed 
March 9, 2018, https://www.opm.gov/fevs/about. 
3 
margin of error.5 The collective output of the survey over time has reflected a DHS 
workforce that is disproportionally disengaged when compared with all other federal 
organizations.  
The engagement variable is significant. While many factors can influence how an 
organization performs, scholars generally believe the most consistent predictor is employee 
engagement, described by Robinson, Perryman, and Hayday as “a positive attitude held by 
an employee towards an organization and its value. An engaged employee is aware of 
business context, and works with colleagues to improve performance within the job for the 
benefit of the organization.”6  
Over the course of several years, DHS diligently researched the engagement 
problem identified by FEVS to identify root causes. It commissioned multiple studies, 
created steering committees and focus groups, conducted internal surveys, and solicited 
candid feedback from employees in town hall meetings across the country.7 DHS analyzed 
the cumulative data from its research and concluded that employee disengagement was the 
product of poor leadership.8 That finding is supported by the work of prominent researchers 
who have likewise held that employee engagement is driven by leadership.9 An 
organization’s performance rises and falls based on employee engagement, and 
                                                 
5 Doris Hausser, “Understanding the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey” (working paper, National 
Academy of Public Administration, 2018), 1, https://www.napawash.org/uploads/AWP_2_Understanding_ 
the_Federal_Employee_Viewpoint_Survey.pdf. 
6 Dilys Robinson, Sarah Perryman, and Sue Hayday, The Drivers of Employee Engagement, Report 
408 (Brighton, UK: Institute for Employment Studies, 2004), http://www.employment-studies.co.uk/ 
system/files/resources/files/408.pdf. 
7 U.S. Office of the Inspector General, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of the Inspector General, 2016), 11, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-08-Nov16.pdf; Office of the Chief Human 
Capital Officer, 2016 Accomplishments Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2016), 28–36; Jerry Markon, “DHS Studies Its Endless Morale Problems, Then Studies Them Some More,” 
Washington Post, February 20, 2015, sec. Politics, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-
security-has-done-little-for-low-morale-but-study-it--repeatedly/2015/02/20/f626eba8-b15c-11e4-886b-
c22184f27c35_story.html. 
8 Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, 2016 Accomplishments Report, 31. 
9 Robert Hogan and Robert B. Kaiser, “What We Know about Leadership,” Review of General 
Psychology 9, no. 2 (2005): 169–80, https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.2.169; James K. Harter et al., The 




engagement is moderated by leadership.10 The tool that the federal government relies on 
to measure organizational performance has consistently identified DHS as a poor 
performer: DHS has a persistent leadership problem. 
That topic has been the subject of reports issued by Congress, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of Inspector General (OIG), think tanks, and 
watchdog groups, as well as academic papers, public speeches, and news articles.11 The 
external perspectives of the problem are perhaps best encapsulated by a starkly worded 
OIG memorandum from November 2016. It concluded that DHS leadership challenges 
were attributable to the repeated failure of leaders to provide meaningful guidance to the 
workforce, poor communication between leaders and staff, a lack of leader accountability, 
the absence of effort to build employee relationships, and insufficient attention paid to 
training and developing the DHS leadership corps.12  
In response, DHS has initiated or expanded programs intended to improve 
leadership at all levels by focusing on the development of existing leaders via training and 
                                                 
10 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Call to Action: Improving First-Level Supervision of Federal 
Employees (Washington, DC: U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2010), 4, https://www.mspb.gov/MS 
PBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=516534&version=517986&application=ACROBAT. 
11 Tom Colburn, A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance 
(Washington, DC: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2015), http://www.hsgac. 
senate.gov/download/?id=B92B8382-DBCE-403C-A08A-727F89C2BC9B; Mark T. Kaminsky, “Effective 
Selection: A Study of First-Line Supervisor Selection Processes in the Department of Homeland Security” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA543301; 
Markon, “DHS Studies Its Endless Morale Problems, Then Studies Them Some More”; Jeffrey M. Miller, 
Rescuing Tomorrow Today: Fixing Training and Development for DHS Leaders, Accession Number: 
AD1029855 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD10 
29855; “Agency Report: Department of Homeland Security,” Partnership for Public Service, accessed 
September 29, 2017, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/detail/HS00; Jerry Markon, “Homeland 
Security Ranks Dead Last in Morale―Again―but Jeh Johnson’s Morale Is High,” Washington Post, 
September 29, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/09/29/dhs-disappointed-
by-latest-low-morale-scores-vows-to-keep-trying/?utm_term=.c81030c66e3b. 
12 U.S. Office of the Inspector General, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security, 3. 
5 
mentorship.13 In October 2017, then-acting Secretary Elaine Duke announced a “DHS 
leadership year” to promote awareness about available development resources, and the 
critical role leadership plays in mission success.14 Although these measures have resulted 
in marginal improvements, DHS remains entrenched in the bottom tier of every 
government scale of organizational health since 2010.15  
C. A GAMBLING FALLACY 
While the issues associated with existing leaders have received ample attention, the 
selection process that precipitated them has not.16 This gap represents an opportunity to 
explore a nascent space and suggest new solutions to target the problem at its source. Good 
leaders are critical to DHS, and some candidates are more suitable than others.17 Were this 
not true, DHS would forego the time and expense of a formal selection process and simply 
choose its leaders by rolling dice or drawing straws. The irony is, that might be exactly 
what DHS is unwittingly doing now. 
The most common misunderstanding about science is that scientists seek 
and find truth. They don’t―they make and test models. . . . Building models 
is very different from proclaiming truths.18 
                                                 
13 “DHS Leader Development Program | Office of Leadership (CG-12C),” U.S. Coast Guard, accessed 
March 11, 2018, http://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Human-
Resources-CG-1/Civilian-Human-Resources-Diversity-and-Leadership-Directorate-CG-12/Office-of-
Leadership-CG-12C/DHS-Leader-Development/; Government Accountability Office, DHS Training: 
Improved Documentation, Resource Tracking, and Performance Measurement Could Strengthen Efforts, 
GAO-14-688 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), 10, http://www.gao.gov/prod 
ucts/GAO-14-688. 
14 “DHS Leadership Year,” Department of Homeland Security, December 6, 2017, https://www.dhs. 
gov/dhs-leadership-year. 
15 “Unlocking Federal Talent,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed March 11, 2018, 
https://www.unlocktalent.gov/employee-engagement; “Best Places to Work Agency Rankings,” 
Partnership for Public Service, accessed March 11, 2018, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rank 
ings/overall/large.  
16 National Academy of Public Administration, Building a 21st Century SES: Ensuring Leadership 
Excellence in Our Federal Government (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 
2017), 163, https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/Building-a-21st-Century-SES-
3.17.2017.pdf. 
17 Shelly Kirkpatrick and Edwin Locke, “Leadership: Do Traits Matter?,” The Executive 5, no. 2 (May 
1991): 48, https://sites.fas.harvard.edu/~soc186/AssignedReadings/Kirkpatrick-Traits.pdf. 
18 Neil Gershenfeld, “Truth is a Model,” in This Will Make You Smarter: New Scientific Concepts to 
Improve Your Thinking, ed. John Brockman (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012), 72–73. 
6 
While varying somewhat between sub-components, the DHS leadership selection 
process relies essentially on self-representations made by candidates in the form of 
resumes, responses to knowledge/skill/achievement (KSA) questionnaires, and oral 
interviews.19 In effect, selection decisions are based on storytelling, or how convincingly 
candidates can portray ideal versions of themselves to experts, and the ability of experts to 
intuit the best candidate for a leadership position when they see one. 
The flawed belief that experts can intuitively identify leaders is not new. Nobel 
Laureate and psychologist Daniel Kahneman describes the same fallacies at work in the 
Israeli Army’s overconfident reliance on intuition to select officer candidates. Up until the 
mid-1950s, Israel selected officers based solely on the opinions of expert evaluators 
following brief interviews and observations. Kahneman tested the accuracy of those 
predictions and found that they were about as reliable as random chance.20 A coin toss 
would have been faster, cheaper, and equally effective. That finding revolutionized the 
Israeli Army and kicked off a lifetime of research dedicated to studying cognitive bias and 
flawed heuristics in decision making.21  
The validity of expert intuition was also the subject of a groundbreaking research 
project by noted psychologist and political scientist Philip Tetlock. In 1984, Tetlock began 
a sweeping 20-year study to quantitatively test the predictive accuracy of well-credentialed 
experts. When the results were tallied, the experts were found to be no more accurate than 
a dart-throwing monkey.22 While Tetlock’s study relates to expert geopolitical predictions 
rather than expert leadership predictions, the literature suggests the net result is the same. 
Expert intuition is not a reliable basis for decisions in domains of complexity. 
                                                 
19 Kaminsky, “Effective Selection,” 36–38. 
20 Daniel Kahneman, “Don’t Blink! The Hazards of Confidence,” New York Times, sec. Magazine, 
October 19, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/dont-blink-the-hazards-of-confid 
ence.html. 
21 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures,” 
June 1977, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA047747; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
“Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–31, http://www. 
jstor.org/stable/1738360. 
22 Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?, 1st. pbk. ed. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 20. 
7 
The DHS leadership selection process also fails to measurably correlate predictions 
(how an expert thought a candidate would perform as a leader if promoted) with outcomes 
(how that leader actually performed after promotion). This means that after a promotion 
decision is made, no one can answer a simple yet vital question: Was that a good decision? 
Without an objectively accurate answer, officials cannot assess the performance of the 
selection process to identify errors, make corrections, and produce better subsequent 
outcomes.  
The problem associated with measuring the performance of a leader is likewise not 
new, and relates to another deceptively simple question: How do you define leadership? 
Decades of research has thus far failed to produce a dispositive answer to that question. 
While the term leadership is conversationally ubiquitous, it is not “a scientific term with a 
formal, standardized definition.”23 The failure to define it has led to an associated inability 
to measure it. Today, it is impossible for DHS (or anyone else) to measure the performance 
of a leader in a way that empirically correlates back to the prediction that resulted in a 
leader’s selection.  
Even if it were possible to objectively measure a leader, the current DHS 
performance management system would be insufficient to the task because it finds that 
99% of all employees are fully successful in their performance, which makes any search 
for meaningful distinctions a futile endeavor.24 It is impossible to succeed if it is impossible 
to fail. Systems that do not objectively compare expected outcomes against actual 
outcomes are open data loops.25 Much like an assembly line that terminates in a dark room, 
open data loop systems repeat the same process over and over, with no means of identifying 
flaws to improve performance. DHS uses an open data loop system to select its leaders. 
They do not produce good outcomes. 
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That which is measured improves. That which is measured and reported 
improves exponentially.26 
Superforecasting is the term Tetlock coined to describe a revolutionary method for 
improving intelligence forecasts of complex future events.27 Superforecasting mitigates the 
impact of unconscious bias and flawed heuristics by harnessing the aggregated judgments 
of multiple crowdsourced forecasters in place of individual experts. Forecasters receive 
training in such areas as bias mitigation, heuristics, groupthink avoidance, and probability. 
This improves accuracy. Forecasters are placed into loosely connected groups to facilitate 
collaboration, red teaming, and post-mortem analysis, which improves accuracy. The 
accuracy of every forecaster’s prediction is scored, and the value of a future prediction is 
weighted (artificially adjusted) based on the forecaster’s past performance. This improves 
accuracy. Scores are used to identify and correct errors in a forecaster’s judgment, which 
also improves accuracy. Finally, scores are published to spur competition for recognition, 
thereby driving forecasters to work harder, which improves accuracy. 
The core question asked by the status quo DHS selection process is “Which of these 
candidates will be the best leader?” It is an intuitive, subjective prediction made by an 
expert, or a small group of experts. This thesis explores what would happen if that question 
were fundamentally changed. What if good leadership were defined not as the presence of 
isolated characteristics, self-reported and desirable sui generis, but rather as the sum total 
of leader traits, characteristics, or behaviors that cause a group to perform the way an 
organization wants it to? If group performance (which can be measured) became a proxy 
for leadership performance (which cannot be measured), then the core question asked by 
the selection process becomes “Which of these candidates will produce the best performing 
group?” Using a superforecasting methodology to ask that question mitigates the impact of 
bias inherent in expert intuition. Measuring the difference between predicted outcomes 
before a promotion and actual outcomes thereafter would produce analyzable data to 
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identify flaws, update beliefs, and improve subsequent predictions. Different organizations 
need their groups to perform in different ways. A leadership position may require a range 
of different characteristics depending on how an organization wants a specific group to 
perform. Likewise, the optimal tools to identify those traits are subject to change. In this 
way, a superforecasted leadership selection process is modular and can be individually 
tailored to keep pace with the changing needs of different DHS subcomponents.  
While the independent literatures for superforecasting, cognitive bias, decision 
making, and leadership are robust, the area where those domains potentially overlap is 
uncharted territory. This thesis seeks to investigate that space and its potential to strengthen 
DHS by examining leadership selection at the system or network level. At its core, 
leadership selection is simply a prediction, or a forecast. It is an educated but nonetheless 
imperfect best guess about how a candidate observed today will perform tomorrow. It is a 
process predicated on loosely held beliefs that must constantly be tested, analyzed, 
questioned, measured, and updated with new data. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Could DHS use a superforecasting methodology to improve its leadership selection 
process? 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Cognitive Bias as It Relates to Judgment and Decision-Making 
Superforecasting is grounded in multiple interrelated fields of study, including 
judgment and decision making (JDM), heuristics, accountability theory, risk management, 
and network theory. Tetlock’s first book, Expert Political Judgment (EPJ), demonstrated 
the pervasive and enduring appeal of raw intuition as a flawed basis for expert judgment.28 
That finding served as a springboard to launch a new understanding of how to reliably 
improve the predictive accuracy of forecasts related to complex future geopolitical 
                                                 
28 Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment. 
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events.29 Tetlock’s view that poor judgment is rooted in cognitive bias and flawed 
heuristics is only useful to the extent that it successfully explains why.30 For an answer to 
that question, the most authoritative voices are those of psychologists Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky (KT), who began a partnership on the subject in 1969.31  
In broad-brush terms, the collective output of their research is the finding that 
humans unconsciously bridge gaps between the known and the unknown by adopting 
beliefs unbound by empirical evidence or logic.32 These mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are 
frequently flawed. They are also generally avoidable. KT’s research methodology typically 
involved asking study participants to make subjective estimates about uncertain future 
events in which some, but not all, variables were presented, and evaluating the manner in 
which participants cognitively filled in the gaps to form a judgment.33 Consistently 
erroneous leaps in logic were examined and subsequently labeled by KT to (hopefully) 
diminish their impact on future decisions. For example, KT found that humans tend to 
misinterpret how important a variable is based on how readily it comes to mind. KT named 
this phenomenon the availability heuristic.34 One might use it today to explain why an 
average American would overestimate the odds of being the victim of a natural disaster.35 
While some might hasten to presume that poor judgment correlates to the intellectual 
sophistication of the forecaster, KT’s research demonstrates that intelligent experts are not 
immune, and in matters involving confidence, are likely even more susceptible to error.36 
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Following Tversky’s death in 1996, Kahneman continued his work in the field, and in 2013, 
published a book that parsed the dichotomous relationship between the intuitive and 
deliberate processes believed to characterize human thought: System 1 and System 2.37 
System 1 is quick, effortless, and responsible for the bulk of human judgments.38 System 
2 is much slower, objectively analytical, and requires effort to initiate.39 The literature 
associated with bias and heuristics, both original and derivative, is robust, and the findings 
have been replicated across multiple disciplines.40  
This is not to say that it is an uncontested field of research. Perhaps the most vocal 
critic over the years has been psychologist and social researcher Gerd Gigerenzer, who 
believed that the sheer number of heuristic flaws identified by KT rendered the collective 
findings worthless.41 At one point, Gigerenzer compared KT’s work with the interpretative 
variability of a Rorschach test, which is not an accusation completely devoid of merit.42 
The first verbal volley fired by Gigerenzer sparked an epic nerd war between the two 
collegiate camps that would find no equal until the bloody Kirk/Picard conflict of 2003.43 
For a more thoughtful criticism of KT’s work, one might turn to Gary Klein, a 
former research psychologist for the U.S. Air Force. While KT’s work focused on the virtue 
of System 2 thinking and the means to developing its use, Klein took a polar opposite 
approach. His research engaged the instances in which experts have reliably used intuitive 
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judgment to derive accurate solutions at blazing speeds. Chess masters sort through tens of 
thousands of potential moves to discern an optimal solution in seconds, medical 
professionals instantly diagnose complex illnesses from a handful of observed symptoms, 
and firefighters demonstrate an uncanny capacity to recognize danger in the fleeting 
moments before disaster strikes.44 Klein dubbed this phenomenon naturalistic decision 
making, and his theory of it suggests that experts make sound judgments based on 
experience with past outcomes as opposed to an analysis of future alternatives.45 The 
genesis of this theory began with a research methodology involving interviews with fire 
commanders following critical incidents.46 The consensus among Klein’s research subjects 
was that they did not engage in a deliberate, analytical process, or option-weighing exercise 
to achieve an acceptable conclusion; instead, they relied on the instant recollection and 
aggregation of prior experiences and outcomes to guide their actions.47 Based on his 
research, Klein believed that training should focus on the repetitive drilling of pattern-
matching and recognition exercises, to enable faster intuitive responses.48  
In 2006, a recommendation was made to the U.S. Army to adopt Klein’s 
recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) conclusions into a new decision model to 
replace the ponderous seven-step process in place at the time.49 The National Fire Academy 
and the U.S. Marine Corps have incorporated RPD-based drills into their respective 
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regimens.50 Much like KT, however, Klein was not immune to criticism. In a 2004 article 
for Military Review, Dr. Karol Ross et al. asked a series of reasonable questions.51 What if 
the experience upon which a future decision is based was not very good, or if the problem 
set is entirely novel? Those are valid concerns in a complex world. Another good question 
might be: How credible are the recollections on which RPD research is based, given that 
they were all made with the benefit of hindsight?52 
Thus far, the competing scholarship of Kahneman and Klein appears to occupy 
seats at opposite ends of judgment’s ideological table, with intuition and objective 
deliberation at odds, and mutually exclusive. A closer inspection, however, suggests 
surprising areas of consensus. Perhaps demonstrating an intellectual maturity that comes 
with 14 years of diligent study following the Gigerenzer slap fight, Kahneman and Klein 
took advantage of a tragic incident to explore the domains of their respective approaches 
to judgment and collaboratively authored a paper, which found surprising areas of 
consensus.53  
In 1988, the USS Vincennes erroneously launched an Aegis cruise missile at an 
overhead Iranian commercial airliner.54 The fallout from that event precipitated a meeting 
sponsored by the U.S. Navy, which was attended by 30 accomplished researchers in the 
field of decision making that inaugurated a seven-year study of tactical judgment.55 The 
conference put Kahneman and Klein in the same room and afforded them an opportunity 
to cooperatively explore a salient question: When is expert intuition a reliable basis for 
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decision making?56 They came to a simple answer: It depends on the environment in which 
those judgments are made.57 
Experts thrive in high-validity environments where causal cues are readily available 
and reliably correlate to specific outcomes. Thus, over time, firefighters develop valuable 
expertise by repetitively experiencing cause and effect events, and therefore, accurately 
predict outcomes with much greater speed than that required by System 2 analysis.58 Such 
knowledge is limited, however, to that specific paradigm. Hence, a firefighter’s ability to 
judge when a burning structure will implode does not transfer to an understanding of when 
an overstressed bridge will collapse. Conversely, expert intuition performs poorly in low-
validity environments, such as those presented by innumerable geopolitical events or 
financial market outcomes.59 In such settings, superior results can be obtained by 
employing a System 2 approach in concert with algorithms to mitigate the impact of bias. 
Indeed, a broad meta-analytic study cited by both Kahneman and Klein found that 
algorithms measurably outperform human judgment in complex environments.60 In the 
minority of instances in which algorithms did not outperform expert judgment, the results 
indicate no measurable difference in accuracy outcomes such that, on balance, mechanical 
tools still produce better outcomes; not perfect, just better.61 Both camps likewise agree on 
the impact of luck in decision making and its likelihood of leading an expert to conclude, 
erroneously, that a good outcome was the product of a good decision.62 For example, in 
poker, an expert might win a hand despite an unpredicted turn of the cards. Pre- and post-
mortem decision analysis is essential for both methodologies.63 One curious conclusion of 
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note is the shared belief that medicine is a high-validity environment, and therefore, well-
suited for the application of expert judgment.64 There is a significant body of research 
pointing to the negative impact of raw intuition on that field and the accuracy 
improvements realized by applying System 2 methodologies.65 
The contribution of KT’s research to the field of superforecasting is profound. Its 
collective output defines the flaws in intuitive decision making and charts a cautiously 
optimistic path toward mitigated effect and reliably improved accuracy; not perfect, just 
better. This writer can find little fault in Tetlock’s final assertion that “the heuristics-and-
biases perspective still provides the best first-order approximation of the errors that real-
world forecasters make and the most useful guidance on how to help forecasters bring their 
error rates down.”66  
2. An Academic Perspective of Leadership 
The Seer-Sucker Theory: No matter how much evidence exists that seers do 
not exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers.67 
—Author J. Scott Armstrong 
 
What is leadership? More than a century of rigorous research by psychologists and 
social scientists has failed to produce a universally accepted definition.68 In a 2007 NPS 
thesis, Nola Joyce counted more than 135,000 different definitions of leadership in 
academic literature.69 This taxonomic imprecision caused one prominent researcher to 
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lament, “there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have 
attempted to define the concept.”70 
In lieu of a comprehensive definition, scholars through the years have filled the 
void by parsing leadership into narrow subcategories for study. Early research in the mid-
1800s began with a trait paradigm focused on heritable qualities.71 Subsequent work 
proposed leadership as a function of demographics, skills, and abilities.72 Looking beyond 
those factors led to an examination of the topic from a psychological perspective and 
focused on personality.73 Other studies concluded that a leader’s psychological makeup is 
less important than the behaviors that she or he exhibits.74 Still others have seen leadership 
as situationally dependent, and have instead focused on environmental factors.75 This 
integrative void has created a muddy academic landscape in which leadership has been 
alternately defined or described by credible authorities using a broad range of terms, 
including influential, transactional, transformational, sensemaking, heroic, charismatic, 
narcissistic, and structural.76 Despite the proliferation and lack of cohesion observed in 
existing constructs, leadership scholars have continued to “create new theories of 
leadership without attempting to compare and contrast the validity of existing theories.”77 
To date, leadership is a term of art, not science. 
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The failure to define a thing has understandably led to an associated failure to 
measure it; indeed, measures of leadership effectiveness throughout the literature 
demonstrate broad interpretative variability.78 Some researchers have measured leadership 
effectiveness based on the extent to which someone is perceived to be “leader-like.”79 
Other studies have been devoted to identifying the characteristics of successful leaders 
based on the speed and trajectory of their career progression, on the premise that leaders 
with successful career tracks are more effective than their slower contemporaries.80 The 
correlation between the characteristics that produce successful careers and those that 
produce successful groups is actually poor.81 Kahneman might refer to this an example of 
the attribute substitution heuristic, or the unconscious use of a simple problem to solve a 
complex one.82 
Does leadership even matter? While still falling short of total agreement, the 
research does reflect greater consensus across multiple disciplines. Scholars are quick to 
point out that organizations are complex and subject to “nonlinear interactions among 
multiple variables in a dynamic system open to outside influences,” which is to say that 
performance is moderated by forces beyond leadership.83 However, multiple studies have 
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found a positive relationship between who is in charge of a group and the quality of the 
group’s performance.84  
The criticality of the role a leader plays within a group is likewise supported from 
a Social Identity perspective.85 According to Dr. David Brannan:  
The relationship between effective patron leadership and group 
effectiveness is always a part of in-group cohesion, shared identity, 
commitment to shared values and goals (Limited Good) and the health of 
the group positively contributing to the self worth and identity of the 
individual. This is all in a constant feed back loop that then contributes to 
more effective and positive perceptions of the group by other individuals. 
Leadership matters. It matters a lot from my perspective.86 
Another testament to the efficacy of leadership may be the thriving industry that in 
recent years has developed around it. In the United States alone, it is a multi-billion-dollar 
enterprise populated by authors, consultants, motivational speakers, coaches, and various 
others to help public and private organizations find, evaluate, select, develop, and retain 
high-performing leaders.87 Evidence that the leadership industry has produced better 
leaders or higher-performing organizations as a result of that investment is not good, yet 
the industry continues to grow.88 How is it possible that competitive businesses that are 
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intensely focused on investment returns would continue to fuel an industry that fails to 
produce positive results?89 Perhaps it is because no one has been keeping score.  
3. Superforecasting 
If I had only followed CNBC’s advice, I’d have a million dollars today. 
Provided I started with 100 million.90 
—Comedian Jon Stewart 
 
In 1984, Tetlock began a 20-year research project to quantitatively test the 
predictive accuracy of the kinds of well-credentialed authorities typically called on for 
advice by government leaders, media outlets, and think tanks. The methodology, although 
Herculean in task, was simple in design. Tetlock recruited a diverse group of 284 leading 
experts who derived income from “commenting or offering advice on political and 
economic trends of significance to the well-being of particular states, regional clusters of 
states, or the international system as a whole.”91 Those experts were tasked with providing 
numerical probability estimates of whether very specific future geopolitical or economic 
events would transpire.92 In all, more than 80,000 predictions were collected and recorded. 
Researchers then waited for tomorrow to become yesterday and tallied the scores. The 
results demonstrated that the public would be better served by consulting a dart-throwing 
chimp, which is exactly what Tetlock wrote when he published the study in 2005.93 Today, 
Tetlock has mixed emotions about the decision to invoke a monkey metaphor because it 
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caused many to miss the salient discovery in a groundbreaking body of research: What 
experts think is far less important than how they think.94  
Each of the experts had invested a lifetime of rigorous work and study into 
mastering one specific area of expertise.95 In doing so, they became what Tetlock 
alliteratively described as hedgehogs; or those who “know one big thing, toil devotedly 
within one tradition, and reach for formulaic solutions to ill-defined problems.”96 Tetlock 
contrasted hedgehogs with foxes, who know many small things. Hedgehogs are intractably 
single-minded and unwilling to consider dissonant perspectives or possibilities.97 They are 
thus blinded to solutions that may exist beyond their discipline. Such blind spots are more 
pronounced when hedgehogs are presented with data deemed incongruent with the 
established values and tenants of their consumers.98 This unwillingness to subvert narrative 
for accuracy produces a myopic perspective that renders hedgehogs particularly vulnerable 
to the cognitive biases that plague humanity.99  
Tetlock’s experts were also handicapped by their dependence on status-conferring 
recognition from governments and popular media outlets, two institutions frequently “less 
interested in the dispassionate pursuit of truth than they are in the buttressing of their 
prejudices.”100 Noted jurist and economist Richard Posner has described such ideological 
pugilists as “advocates specializing in solidarity, not credence.”101 Experts who dare to 
stray from established group narratives pay a heavy price. Former White House National 
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Security Advisor H. R. McMaster recently provided a cautionary tale to other professional 
pundits by deigning to publicly frame Islam as anything other than pure evil.102 Airtime is, 
after all, a scarce resource.103 Are there any predictive realms in which hedgehogs excel? 
Overconfidence in their discipline means that when they bet, they bet big, making them 
really right on rare occasions.104 Hedgehogs are also necessarily adept and convincing 
storytellers with a valuable capacity for asking good questions.105  
The Iraq intelligence failure in 2003 and others preceding it prompted the 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI) to issue a challenge designed to explore the limits of 
prediction.106 The government commissioned five university research teams to compete 
against an IARPA control team in a forecasting tournament to discover which was best and 
why. Each team was tasked with using nothing but publicly available data to provide 
answers to probability questions typically entrusted to analysts.107 Tetlock formed a 
crowdsourced team of more than 2,800 volunteers and labeled them the Good Judgement 
Project (GJP).108 Over the course of four years, GJP provided more than one million 
predictions in response to roughly 500 questions. Throughout the tournament, Tetlock ran 
a constant series of internal tests to determine which specific factors resulted in improved 
accuracy for GJP. Combining those factors that were found to be effective led Tetlock to a 
replicable recipe for producing analytical forecasts that were far superior to those produced 
by any other competitor during the IARPA tournament.  
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The fundamental flaws observed within the U.S. intelligence community relating 
to taxonomy, intuition, bias, and measurement bear a striking resemblance to those 
associated with the status quo leadership selection process. That possibility may hold 
promising implications for DHS. 
F. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is guided by several assumptions: 
• Good leaders are critical to DHS and the execution of its mission. Not all 
employees would make good leaders, so leadership selection is critical to 
DHS. 
• It is impossible to objectively measure the performance of a leader. 
Leadership is a term that has never been defined in a way that allows for 
quantitative comparison or analysis. 
• It is possible to objectively measure the performance of a group, so if a 
leader’s performance were to be measured based on the performance of 
the group for which she or he is responsible, then organizations could 
compare predicted outcomes to actual outcomes. This would transform 
leaders and their groups into distributed data-producing sensor arrays, 
producing analyzable feedback.  
• Closed data loop systems designed to compare predicted outcomes with 
actual outcomes perform better than open data loop systems that do not 
provide output feedback. 
• In complex environments, the accuracy of predictions made by a large, 
loosely networked group of trained forecasters with diverse backgrounds 
will outperform predictions made by a small homogenous group of 
experts.  
The information relied upon for this thesis originated from both primary and 
secondary sources. It synthesized literature and research drawn from multiple fields of 
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study, as well as published reports and survey data from government agencies, think tanks, 
and private corporations. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to exploring the hypothesis that a superforecasting 
methodology could improve the DHS leadership selection process. It is important to 
acknowledge that this thesis cannot conclusively demonstrate that a superforecasting 
methodology will produce measurably better outcomes than the status quo. There are no 
instruments capable of measuring the accuracy of the current selection process, so a direct 
comparison is impossible. While the literature demonstrates that an improved process 
should result in observable changes in DHS (better organizational performance and 
increased levels of employee engagement etc.), the data for those outcomes reside on a 
timeline that exceeds the practical limitations of this work. There are no published case 
studies involving superforecasting and leadership selection. Superforecasting is by nature 
reliant on the aggregation of predictions made by many forecasters. A valid human study 
of that kind would require hundreds or thousands of subjects and three years of rigorous 
data collection. Replication on a small scale with a handful of subjects would produce 
unreliable data because small samples produce extreme results.109 Constructing a statistical 
model to test the hypothesis would be fruitless because human predictions cannot be 
accurately represented by a number on a graph. 
Because these limitations make conventional research methodologies either 
impractical or impossible, this thesis chose to travel an unconventional path in the form of 
a Gedankenerfahrung, or thought experiment.110 Thought experiments typically employ 
subjunctive reasoning to conceptually test an otherwise untestable hypothesis by imagining 
a set of conditions intended to answer the question “what would happen if?” Thus, an 
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otherwise unfalsifiable fancy may still bear fruit. Notable examples include Schrodinger’s 
Cat, Einstein’s relativity theory, and the Turing test.  
This conceptual conveyance aspires to allow the reader to follow the evolution of 
the hypothesis through the writer’s eyes (stumbles and blunders included) and proceeds in 
four chapters. Chapter II uses the established literatures to disassemble Tetlock’s 
superforecasting process into its constituent parts, and places each piece under a 
microscope to blueprint foundations, form, and function in detail. What is it, where did it 
originate, how does it work, why does it work, and what is its role in relation to the other 
parts in the cycle of operation? The parts are then virtually assembled and animated to help 
visualize the entire process, understand where the data originates, how it is processed and 
measured, and how feedback is used to refine performance. Chapter III uses the knowledge 
gained to envision a new superforecasting process, purpose-built for promotion, and 
installed in the most advantageous environment imaginable to test the writer’s belief that 
it might work, even if only under optimal conditions. Chapter IV assumes a Red Team role 
and searches for logic gaps or other vulnerabilities in the hypothesis to invalidate the 
concept. Chapter V recounts the journey to an unexpected conclusion, the insights gained 
along the way, and opportunities for the next expedition.  
Predictive models of any type are either accurate or useful, but never both. The 
model imagined herein is certainly no exception. This thesis is a starting point for exploring 
the stored potential in a superforecasted leadership selection process, not a destination. It 
illuminates the challenges and limitations associated with the status quo and explores the 
potential for the process to evolve into one driven by evidence. 
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II. UNPACKING TETLOCK: THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF 
SUPERFORECASTING  
A. GALTON’S OX 
Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911) was a prolific British scientist and mathematician 
who made substantive contributions to a disparate range of academic disciplines over the 
course of his lifetime.111 One recurrent area of research was eugenics, a term Galton coined, 
which denoted a branch of study dedicated to the hereditary superiority of a minority class 
of human elites, and their exploitation as breeding stock to improve the Homo sapien 
herd.112  
Not surprisingly then, it was with this thought that Galton found himself perusing 
a county livestock fair one brisk autumn month in 1906.113 A contest was underway in 
which attendees were invited to examine a corralled ox, bound for slaughter, and place a 
wager on the ultimate weight of the beast once it was dispatched and dressed for sale.114 In 
exchange for a meager sum, anyone could purchase a ticket and inscribe upon it a best 
guess that was then submitted for the contest. Following the grizzly deed, the contestants 
who came closest to the correct answer were rewarded with a prize.115 Galton’s (ultimately 
misguided) eugenic epistemology left him dubious as to the efficacy of the democratic 
process; specifically, with regard to a commoner’s capacity to make optimal voting 
decisions about complicated governmental issues. The contest, Galton reasoned, was a 
reasonable proxy for simpleton suffrage because “the average competitor was probably as 
well fitted for making a just estimate of the dressed weight of the ox, as an average voter 
is of judging the merits of most political issues on which he votes, and the variety among 
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the voters to judge justly was probably much the same in either case.”116 The modest entry 
fee would not bar participation by even the lowest strata of society, and the prospect of 
prizes would spur contestant rigor. To test this belief, Galton collected all the entry tickets 
at the conclusion of the contest and analyzed their collective output.  
After recording each of the nearly 800 guesses, one might reasonably imagine the 
quiet, self-satisfied grin that passed Sir Galton’s face upon noting that nearly all the 
contestants were not just wrong, but very wrong. Any confirmational elation was fleeting 
however, because when Galton averaged the responses, he was forced to acknowledge a 
disconcerting conclusion. The aggregated wisdom of the common people was nearly 
perfect. The crowd predicted that the final dressed weight of the ox would be 1,197 pounds. 
The scales read 1,198. Not only was the crowd extremely accurate, it was more accurate 
than the best guess of any single member.117 Galton could have easily clung to 
preconception and discarded the results, but to his credit, he reported every detail in an 
article published in 1907. In it, Galton publicly updated his beliefs by concluding, “This 
result is, I think, more credible to the trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than might 
have been expected.”118  
Galton’s findings were not the product of an isolated instance of chance, and the 
aggregation method he described has since demonstrated tremendous efficacy across a 
broad range of problem spaces, including financial markets, election outcomes, 
geopolitical events, technological innovations, sports betting, and social phenomena.119 In 
their book Blind Man’s Bluff, authors Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew detail how the 
wisdom of a crowd was successfully used to pinpoint the location of a lost submarine 
somewhere in the North Atlantic, as well as a sunken hydrogen bomb off the coast of 
Spain.120  
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The key to crowdsourced intelligence, according to Tetlock, lies in “recognizing 
that useful information is often dispersed widely, with one person possessing a scrap, 
another holding a more important piece, a third having a few bits, and so on.”121 In the case 
of the ox, it is reasonable to presume that some of the contestants were experts in the field 
(butchers, farmers, purveyors, etc.), yet based on the individual predictions submitted, none 
of the professionals possessed sufficient information to independently produce the most 
the most accurate estimate. One contestant may have factored local precipitation levels into 
their guess, while another may have had some insight into animal husbandry. A third may 
have known the butcher and how much fat he typically cuts away from the lean. As the 
number of contestants increases, so too does the small scraps of useful information that 
each contributes. Valid information increasingly coalesces around the correct answer, 
while invalid information (or wild guesses) above or below the mark cancel each other out 
when the collective wisdom of the crowd is aggregated and averaged to produce a 
prediction. While aggregated predictions from large groups are typically more accurate 
than the best guess of any individual, this is not always the case. Even within extremely 
complex domains in which outcomes are uncertain, it is certainly possible (either through 
luck or skill) for an expert to demonstrate a degree of accuracy in a single instance that 
borders on clairvoyance. However, it is important to remember that such instances are 
almost never replicated consistently over time. According to Tetlock, “There will be 
individuals who beat the group in each repetition, but they will tend to be different 
individuals.”122 In the long run, betting on the group will produce better overall outcomes. 
The question is this: What kind of group produces optimal outcomes? 
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B. FORECASTER TEAMING 
Madness is the exception in individuals, but the rule in groups.123 
—Philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 
 
1. Group Collaboration: Obstacles and Opportunities 
For decades following the publication of Vox Populi, conventional wisdom held 
that in order for crowdsourced predictions to produce optimal estimates of future events, it 
was critical that individual forecasters contributing to the effort produce judgments that 
were free from external influence. In 2004, James Surowiecki wrote one of the most 
frequently cited books on crowdsourced prediction, which professed “the best way for a 
group to be smart is for each person in it to think and act as independently as possible.”124 
This is to say that, while predictions should emanate from a large, diverse group of 
forecasters, the individual contributors of the group should not be afforded an opportunity 
to work collectively, exchange information, discuss, debate, or influence one another prior 
to submitting their respective estimates. Surowiecki’s assertion rested upon what was at 
the time believed to be a well-established foundation pertaining to the negative impact of 
conformity and consensus seeking behavior within groups tasked with working collectively 
to solve a problem.125 To grasp the source and nature of Surowiecki’s concern, one need 
only bring to mind a solitary word, committees. Sir Barnett Cocks, Clerk of the House of 
Commons, sardonically referred to such collectives as “a cul-de-sac down which ideas are 
lured, and then quietly strangled.”126 
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2. Repurposing Groupthink 
Social psychologist Irving Janis coined the term groupthink in 1971 after studying 
American policy fiascos, such as the Bay of Pigs, Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and the 
Vietnam War.127 Janis sought to understand how otherwise incomparably intelligent 
individuals could reach such poor collaborative conclusions, and categorized his findings 
into eight symptoms of congregate dysfunction.128 
• Invulnerability. Members of decision-making groups feel insulated from 
any individual blame or accountability for poor judgment because of a 
tacit understanding that responsibility will ultimately be borne by the 
group. This belief causes groups to make over confident estimations or 
ignore contrary indications that exist beyond the established in-group 
narrative. 
• Rationale. Members construct baseless rationalizations when faced with 
negative feedback, which, if otherwise given consideration, might cause 
the group to re-evaluate its core assumptions or dominant narrative. As an 
example, Janis cited President Johnson’s advisors and their successive 
wave of decisions to escalate the intensity of bombings in North Vietnam, 
in spite of the fact that every previous escalation had proven ineffective. 
• Morality. Those afflicted with groupthink blindly accept the inherent 
morality of the in-group and either ignore or fail to consider the ethical 
implications of the group’s decisions. 
• Stereotyping. Members of an in-group stereotype those with divergent or 
contradictory viewpoints, to diminish the validity of out-group 
perspectives, such that any serious consideration of an alternative view is 
unwarranted. 
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• Pressure. Within the group, dominant voices and narratives emerge, and 
views begin to coalesce around prevalent opinions or shared illusions. Any 
members who express countervailing ideas or doubt are pressured by the 
majority to fall in line and exhibit loyalty to the group. 
• Self-Censorship. Those who hold views or opinions, which deviate from 
the consensus, tend to remain quiet and keep their objections to 
themselves for the sake of cohesion, as well as the avoidance of pressure. 
• Unanimity. Once the dominant viewpoint emerges, members share in the 
illusion that the group is unanimously behind it. Dissenters censor 
themselves and each member incorrectly presumes that the resulting 
silence is synonymous with consent. 
• Mindguards. Within the group, individuals emerge who actively work to 
insulate members from information or opinions that may challenge or 
discredit the dominant viewpoint.  
Imagine the potential implications had Galton’s group been gathered together prior 
to the slaughter and tasked with working cooperatively to produce a best guess. Some 
forecasters might have resorted to cognitive loafing and failed to devote maximum mental 
effort to the problem on the belief that others within the group would do the work for 
them.129 Within such a group, a small core of thought leaders and influencers might 
reasonably emerge whom, for reasons related to extraversion, persuasive skill, or perhaps 
superficially attractive credentials, are able to coalesce the group around a dominant 
viewpoint.130 Unanimity and consensus are powerful social forces within a group, which 
can cause individuals to strive for the least objectionable solution rather than the most 
accurate solution. Committee members implicitly understand that ultimately the group, 
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rather than its individual members, will be held accountable for the outcome, which 
decreases individual incentive to strive for accurate results (rigor).  
Aggregating a large number of independent predictions has demonstrated utility 
because, when graphed, predictions predicated upon good judgment cluster around the 
correct solution and gain resolution when averaged.131 Predictions resulting from poor 
judgment tend to be equally distributed, and cancel one another out. The effect dramatically 
decreases the signal to noise ratio, thereby increasing accuracy, a curious phenomenon that 
has nonetheless been observed “whether the forecasts are judgmental or econometric or 
extrapolation.”132 An analogous effect may be experienced simply by donning a pair of 
Bose headphones and thumbing the switch.133 Allowing forecasters to work collaboratively 
in groups has been historically problematic because groupthink increases the likelihood of 
errors, and pulls the bulk of those errors in a single direction. When randomly wrong 
becomes consistently wrong, averaging does not dampen the noise, it amplifies it, 
producing static that obscures signal fidelity. For a thorough consideration of groupthink 
and its impact on decision making within the homeland security enterprise, James 
Ricciuti’s 2014 NPS thesis entitled “Groupthink: A Significant Threat to the Homeland 
Security of the United States,” is a wholly worthwhile resource.134  
While maintaining independence within crowdsourced groups of forecasters may 
indeed provide an effective bulwark against the deleterious effects of groupthink, doing so 
limits a group’s prescient potential. Diversity is a silver bullet.135 The virtue of harnessing 
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the collective power of a large, diverse group of forecasters is the broad range of 
knowledge, skills, perspectives, and strategies that can be brought to bear against a 
complex problem.136 However, segregation means that the only beneficiary of that 
cognitive cornucopia is the prediction itself. Maintaining independence prohibits members 
from exploiting fellow forecasters as a means of improving understanding, generating 
encouragement, testing assumptions, detecting flaws, or exploring new methodologies. 
From a social identity perspective, the literature suggests that the desire to perform well in 
front of peers, and thereby increase one’s standing within a group, could be a strong 
motivational factor.137 For Tetlock, the prospect of teaming represented a risky roll of the 
dice, with much to be gained or lost.  
Perhaps one of the most notable outcomes of the GJP experiment then was support 
for the notion that accuracy and independence may comprise a false dichotomy. Through 
a series of controlled experiments examining outcomes resulting from multiple 
organizational modalities, GJP researchers observed that under the proper conditions, 
forecasters could preserve their independence and remain focused on achieving the most 
accurate prediction, while simultaneously exploiting the benefits of team collaboration and 
knowledge sharing. At the end of the GJP experiment, researchers analyzed the data 
produced by the control groups and observed that the accuracy of forecasters who were 
allowed to work together in teams was 23% better than those working independently, and 
the performance gap progressively increased over multiple years without regression.138 In 
fact, teaming produced results that were superior to any other organizational method.139  
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This finding should not be interpreted as an endorsement of committees. 
Collaboration can turbo cognitive exhaust into forecasting fuel, but in order for teaming to 
work successfully, forecasters must learn how to extract maximum benefit from their 
teammates, and the groups must incentivize selfish altruism.140 This is to say that 
forecasters diligently work to improve their group’s performance with the understanding 
that doing so improves their own performance. One factor found to ameliorate groupthink’s 
impact upon the collaborative efficacy of teams over the course of the GJP study was 
accountability. 
3. Optimizing Accuracy via Accountability 
In general, the literature suggests that cognitive effort exerted towards a task 
increases in proportion to the level of anticipated accountability.141 On that basis, GJP 
researchers suspected that forecasters could attain the benefits of working collaboratively 
in teams while still maintaining maximum individual effort by holding individual 
forecasters, rather than the team to which they were assigned, ultimately accountable. The 
subsequent question became, accountable for what? 
The question was rooted in the difference between process and outcome 
accountability.142 In the case of process accountability, people are judged based upon the 
quality of the method employed to produce a result.143 Outcome accountability only 
considers the quality of the end result, without considering how the result was achieved.144 
Literature on the subject lacked consensus. Some researchers found that outcome 
                                                 
140 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of 
Accelerations (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016), loc. 802, Kindle, paraphrasing John Donovan 
“digital exhaust into digital fuel.” 
141 Elizabeth Weldon, “Cognitive Loafing: The Effects of Accountability and Shared Responsibility on 
Cognitive Effort,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 14, no. 1 (March 1988): 159–71, http:// 
journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167288141016. 
142 Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock, “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,” Psychological 
Bulletin 125, no. 2 (1999): 258, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jenniferlerner/files/lerner_and_tetlock_19 
99_pb_paper.pdf. 
143 Lerner and Tetlock, 258. 
144 Lerner and Tetlock, 258. 
34 
accountability produced higher levels of performance-inhibiting anxiety.145 Others held 
that while process accountability did improve performance when applied to simple 
unambiguous tasks in which cause and effect were understood, the results were not 
generalizable across the board.146 Process accountability might work well for employees 
of fast food chains (lettuce on top of tomato, not tomato on top of lettuce), but be less 
effective for employees charged with predicting price futures in volatile commodity 
markets.147 GJP researchers noted that most of the research at the time stemmed from 
studies of single-session experiments involving simple tasks, and did not evaluate a 
subject’s ability to evolve or adapt to a variety of complex challenges over time.148 Tetlock 
believed that tasking forecasters to produce the most accurate prediction possible, without 
stipulating how, would incentivize them to take methodological risks by searching for 
creative new strategies in response to dynamic problem spaces.149 Whereas process 
accountability would produce “consistency with standard practices,” the alternative would 
increase adaptive performance “because outcome goals move people to the novel and 
unfamiliar, they can gain a sense of enthusiasm, curiosity, and urgency-all of which 
stimulate exploration and learning.”150 It was a testable hypothesis. 
To evaluate the various modalities, GJP researchers publicly recruited 1,850 
subjects from across the United States to participate in a one-year forecasting tournament, 
and randomly assigned them to a series of accountability and collaboration conditions. One 
might think of it as a smaller experiment tucked within the larger GJP experiment. A zero 
accountability control group receiving no feedback on either process or outcome was 
created for benchmark comparison. Subjects were randomly assigned to process, outcome, 
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and hybrid accountability conditions. Thirty teams, each comprised of 13 forecasters, were 
created to work collaboratively, and the residual study subjects were tasked with working 
independently. Forecasters working within teams were enabled and encouraged to share 
strategies, justifications, estimates, etc. with their teammates. All the forecasters worked 
within a custom online platform created by researchers. Those working independently used 
the online platform to submit forecasts, notate the thought process and justifications that 
contributed to their forecasts, and receive feedback from researchers. For teams, the 
platform also served as the means of collaboration via forum conversations, such that team 
members were loosely networked and never met face to face. Team members could also 
use the platform to subjectively rate the quality of information, ideas, criticisms, or 
strategies shared by fellow forecasters. The platform provided researchers with complete 
visibility in order to measure and record variables including forecaster engagement, 
knowledge transfer, and belief updating. Every team was organized with a flat leaderless 
hierarchy that allowed roles and relationships to develop organically within each group.  
All of the study participants received a ~ 60-minute on-line training module, 
dubbed CHAMPS KNOW, which served as a best practice guide involving psychological 
principles and strategies to improve probabilistic reasoning and predictive accuracy. 
Details of the training module are discussed in a subsequent section. The final portion of 
the training module detailed how the performance of each forecaster would be evaluated. 
Those assigned to the process condition were told that they would be judged on the quality 
of their forecasting method, as well as the extent to which it conformed to best practice 
guidelines, with no consideration of the outcome of that process. Process forecasters 
assigned to a team were also judged on their level of engagement and collaboration with 
teammates, in conformance with established best practice guidelines. Outcome forecasters 
were informed that their solitary objective was to produce the most accurate predictions 
possible, without consideration of the process used to obtain that result. Outcome 
forecasters assigned to teams were encouraged to share and collaborate with their 
teammates, but the method and frequency of collaboration was left to individual discretion. 
Forecasters assigned to the hybrid assessment condition were told that both process and 
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outcome would be equally weighted and scored. This applied to hybrid forecasters working 
individually or within teams. 
Over the course of a year, study participants provided probability estimates for 135 
questions regarding the likelihood of complex future geopolitical events coming to pass. 
The topics were diverse and fluid (currency fluctuations, public health, power politics, 
etc.), such that a forecaster with a strong knowledge base in one particular discipline or 
region could not hold sway over the course of the study. Participants could use information 
or research from any open (unclassified) source. Forecasters in all of the accountability 
conditions received regular feedback from researchers. Process forecasters received 
monthly scores reflecting the quality of their methodology. Process scores were the product 
of a matrix established by researchers which rated factors such as the number of forecasts 
submitted per question (belief updating), the number of hyperlinks included in a given 
justification, the number of analytic observations in a justification, and the extent to which 
justifications conform to best practice guidelines. Process forecasters also routinely 
received examples of high quality justifications based on CHAMPS KNOW principles to 
help develop their analytic methodology. Outcome forecasters, conversely, only received 
scores reflecting the accuracy of their final prediction for each question. Members of the 
hybrid condition received scores reflecting an equal weight average of outcome and 
process. All of the participants (excluding the control group) received feedback on the 
ultimate outcomes for each question, so forecasters could examine predicted results versus 
actual results to identify judgment errors and refine analytic techniques. 
This particular study was valuable because it examined the cognitive process as a 
continuum rather than a solitary event, and explored a forecaster’s potential to adapt and 
improve over time under multiple operant conditions. At the end of the experiment, 
researchers analyzed the data and found that forecasters who were held to some form of 
accountability consistently outperformed those who were not by a statistically significant 
margin. Individuals in the outcome condition outperformed process condition forecasters. 
Teaming amplified the accuracy of outcome forecasters, such that it was “about twice as 
effective at improving accuracy as process accountability, when compared to a no 
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accountability baseline.”151 Rather than regressing, the effect actually increased over time, 
and the accuracy of outcome accountable teams gradually improved throughout the 
duration of the study because forecasters learned and operationalized new strategies to 
leverage their teammates as a means of improving individual performance. 
C. FORECASTER TRAINING 
1. Less Wrong 101 
There is a wealth of research dedicated to judgment and decision-making that 
collectively points to the frequency with which humans reach avoidably erroneous 
conclusions because of flawed probabilistic reasoning, cognitive bias, and irrational 
heuristics.152 Given the criticality of accurate estimations to every facet of life, it is not 
surprising that the literature exploring strategies to improve the quality of human 
judgments via training related interventions is likewise abundant.153 However, according 
to Welton Chang et al. in “Developing Expert Political Judgment: The Impact of Training 
and Practice on Judgmental Accuracy,” their review of the literature associated with such 
strategies encountered several of the same shortcomings found in the accountability studies 
referenced previously.154 The prevailing JDM training studies focused on isolated, solitary 
events, and typically failed to examine a forecaster’s capacity to benefit from things like 
training, repetition, and feedback over a continuum. They likewise failed to assess whether 
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any improvements in subject performance were sustainable, or simply short-lived 
performance bumps subject to inevitable regression. Study subjects were also noted to lack 
any meaningful motivation to improve their performance, and the intervention(s) used by 
researchers in any given study tended to be tailored to mitigate a solitary heuristic defect 
rather than exploring the possibility to attack the problem holistically. GJP was an 
opportunity to test the hypothesis that improvements to judgmental accuracy resulting from 
training, feedback, and practice could be not only sustainable but also generalizable across 
a variety of judgmental challenges.155 
GJP researchers publicly recruited a “highly diverse cross-section of the 
population” to serve as volunteer forecasters in the four year IARPA tournament, and 
randomly assigned them to training or control conditions.156 At the beginning of each year, 
members of the training condition participated in a simple online instruction module 
designed to last no more than one hour. While the content of the training evolved somewhat 
over the course of the study, it remained a collection of best practice guidelines and 
strategies designed to help forecasters increase the accuracy of their predictions by 
avoiding common pitfalls, learning from errors, and maximizing the resources at their 
disposal.157 Modules on probabilistic reasoning were accompanied by scenarios to 
reinforce key points. All of the information was supported with illustrative graphics, and 
each module concluded with knowledge checks or a brief quiz to allow students to assess 
their understanding.158 Through a series of short lessons, forecasters learned that they could 
improve the quality of their thinking about uncertain outcomes by abandoning quick, 
intuitive judgments and instead adopting a more deliberate cognitive style informed by an 
understanding of probability, as well as the need to consider disconfirming possibilities 
and constantly update beliefs based on new information. 
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2. Belief Updating 
Cable from Churchill to Lord Keynes: Am coming around to your point of 
view. Keynes reply: Sorry to hear it. Have started to change my mind.159 
—Author Noel Busch 
 
The belief updating concept featured heavily throughout all forecaster training and 
originated from a theory developed by Thomas Bayes, a Presbyterian minister and 
statistician from London, whose grand contribution to probabilistic reasoning was released 
following his death in 1761.160 Bayes’ theorem incorporates multiple foundational 
concepts to improve probabilistic reasoning when the available data is scarce or 
inconclusive. The core concept involves starting with an initial estimate based upon an 
outside perspective of the problem space and gradually working inward, making 
incremental estimate updates at each interval based upon the value of the prior estimate, in 
light of the new evidence.161 As an example, imagine a person challenged with guessing 
whether an obviously introverted student observed walking across the lawn of a major 
university is a member of the business school, or a math Ph.D. candidate.162 An intuitive 
forecaster might reflexively reason that mathematics students are far more likely to be 
introverts when compared to business students and confidently assign a high probability 
that the student belongs to the math program. By contrast, a Bayesian trained forecaster 
starts by considering the outside perspective of the problem first, often in the form of 
historic frequency or total population. How many business school students are there in 
comparison to math Ph.D. candidates? Business school students are far more prevalent, so 
a reasonable estimate might be ten to one, thus there is a 90% likelihood that the observed 
student is enrolled in the business program. What portion of each population is introverted? 
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One might assign a 75% likelihood for math and 15% for business, so based solely on that 
estimate, it is five times more likely that the correct answer is math. However, in 
considering the anterior estimate (1:10) in light of the posterior (75:15), the final ratio is 
1:2, making it twice as likely that the shy student belongs to the business school, and that 
the intuitively attractive answer is ultimately incorrect. 
A Bayesian approach to cognitive reasoning can provide utility across a broad range 
of complex problem spaces because it encourages forecasters to consider base rates, discard 
preconceptions, break seemingly intractable problems into smaller constituent parts, and 
think probabilistically. Nuclear physicist and Nobel laureate Enrico Fermi was famously 
fond of challenging students to use similar principles to estimate answers to superficially 
unanswerable questions using scarce supporting data.163 One frequently cited example of 
a puzzle employed by Fermi is how many piano tuners are there in Chicago?164 In lieu of 
a go with your gut answer, a GJP trained forecaster might begin by guessing the total 
population of Chicago, perhaps 2.5 million. In general, how many people in the United 
States actually have a piano? A blind guess might be one in one hundred, but if the number 
of institutions (universities, schools, music venues, etc.) owning pianos were also factored 
in, then maybe the ratio becomes two in one hundred. That would lead the forecaster to 
guess that there are about 50,000 pianos in Chicago. Some pianos are undoubtedly tuned 
more frequently than others, but on average, a neophyte might imagine that once per year 
is a reasonable frequency. Most people work 40 hours per week and spend two weeks per 
year on vacation, so an average piano tuner probably works 2,000 hours per year. Factoring 
in travel time to various job sites, and other administrative tasks, might decrease that 
number by 20%, bringing the total to 1,600 hours. How long does it take a piano tuner to 
tune a piano? If the forecaster guessed two hours, then a total of 100,000 tuning hours per 
year would be required to tune the 50,000 pianos estimated to be in Chicago. Dividing the 
total tuning hours required per year, by the number of hours a single tuner can devote to 
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the task, produces a rough estimate that there are 63 piano tuners in Chicago. While it is 
unlikely that 63 is ultimately the correct response to the question, it is probably more 
accurate than a purely intuitive guess, and illustrates one effective strategy taught by GJP 
researchers to improve the accuracy of estimates associated with ambiguous or complex 
problems about which little is known. That style of outside-in thinking can provide 
forecasters with a course initial estimate, which can be further refined with increasing 
granularity as new evidence becomes available.  
3. Sandbox Socialization: Learning How to Play Well with Others 
In order to extract the maximum benefit from teams within the tournament, 
forecasters were explicitly educated about the advantages and disadvantages of working in 
groups. One of the dangers of sliding into groupthink is the tendency for teams to seek 
consensus, or subconsciously pilot themselves towards the least objectionable solution, 
rather than the most accurate result, so forecasters were advised to “never stop doubting” 
and to be “cooperative but not deferential” towards teammates.165 Agreement within a 
group does not mean a particular judgment is correct, and disagreement is not an indication 
that something is wrong.166 Indeed, disagreement can be beneficial as a means of 
expanding understanding and testing the validity of dissonant perspectives to refine 
judgment. Disagreement can alternatively produce acrimony and dysfunction if, for 
example, factions form behind clashing personalities, generating excessive heat and 
insufficient light.167 Forecasters were trained to recognize indications of groupthink as well 
as specific interventions to guard against its insurgence within the team. GJP researchers 
taught forecasters how to “disagree without being disagreeable” and to actively use 
constructive confrontation, a term coined by former Intel CEO Andrew Grove, as a means 
of challenging assertions by disassembling arguments and asking precise questions to elicit 
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detailed responses.168 Forecasters also learned how to use teammates to assist with post-
mortem analysis throughout the tournament season.169 A post-mortem analysis takes place 
after a prediction has been submitted and the Brier score has been calculated as a means of 
evaluating the quality of the judgment that produced the prediction, in order to identify 
errors or opportunities for improvement.170 Post-mortem analysis can illuminate “whether 
forecasters coalesced around a bad anchor, framed the problem poorly, overlooked an 
important insight, or failed to engage (or even muzzled) team members with dissenting 
views. Likewise, they can highlight the process steps that led to good forecasts and thereby 
provide…best practices for improving predictions.”171 Post-mortem analysis is valuable 
because, when considered in a vacuum, a good Brier score by itself does not necessarily 
indicate sound reasoning. For example, a parent who bet their child’s entire college fund 
on a single game of roulette and won on the spin demonstrated good luck, not good 
judgment. Likewise, a poor Brier score might not necessarily indicate flawed thinking. A 
forecaster’s prediction regarding anticipated growth within a specific regional economic 
sector might have produced an excellent Brier score had an unforeseeable Black Swan 
natural disaster not intervened.172  
Red teaming and pre-mortem analysis both serve a similar function within teams 
but take place before a final prediction is submitted. Red teaming invites several forecasters 
within a group to form a devil’s advocate brigade. Red Teams then attack a teammate’s 
belief or line of reasoning in order to probe for weakness or identify flaws, thereby creating 
opportunities for improvement. In medicine, a pre-mortem analysis challenges a physician 
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to assume that a given diagnosis was wrong and resulted in the death of the patient. The 
objective is to gaze down at the imagined corpse on the slab and work backwards from the 
time of death to identify plausible scenarios for the patient’s demise. GJP forecasters were 
shown how to use that technique within their own groups. Assume a prediction about a 
future event is wrong and the opposite comes to pass, then imagine the likely reasons that 
might explain the unanticipated outcome, as a means of evaluating the soundness of the 
original judgment. It is worth noting here that while the intractable singlemindedness 
observed in hedgehogs makes them comparatively poor forecasters, they are exceptionally 
adept at telling persuasive stories and asking good questions, which makes them valuable 
teammates for foxes wishing to test a hypothesis. This feature speaks further to the virtue 
of cognitive diversity within groups. 
4. Hic Svnt Dracones 
The root causes of many judgmental errors can be traced back to failures to 
understand and account for the role of probability in complex problem spaces, in concert 
with pervasive cognitive biases and flawed mental shortcuts used to span the gaps between 
known and unknown.173 Humans have an inherent affinity for patterns coupled with an 
innate capacity to rapidly manufacture reason in response to uncertainty or ambiguity.174 
These evolutionary traits are both a blessing and a curse. A hunter’s ability to instantly 
identify, interpret, and respond to nearly imperceptible environmental signals is vital. 
Rustling leaves may portend predator or prey, and the quality of the outcome is dictated by 
the speed with which the hunter can recall a similar experience to execute a solution. 
Conversely, forecasters who attempt to guess likely future outcomes of complex, 
multivariate events using reflexive, intuitive judgments without pausing to consider 
historic frequency or fundamental statistical principles are less likely to produce accurate 
predictions. 
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The problem is well illustrated by Kahneman’s presentation of U.S. cancer rates in 
Thinking, Fast and Slow.175 Imagine a group of people asked to provide plausible 
explanations for the fact that among the 3,141 counties in the United States, those with the 
highest rate of kidney cancer are in small, rural, Southern communities. Depending upon a 
respondent’s particular worldview, accusatory fingers might be pointed at a broad range of 
culprits. People in small rural communities are poor and poor people make bad health 
choices. They smoke and drink alcohol more than their more sophisticated urban 
neighbors. They cannot afford adequate healthcare. They tend to be superstitious and 
distrust the science of modern medicine. The U.S. healthcare system does not provide the 
same level of screening and care to poor people. Rural residents eat fast food in lieu of 
organic diets. Governments dump toxic industrial waste in rural communities. Rural 
communities offer fewer employment opportunities, so residents are forced to take 
hazardous jobs that expose them to harsh, potentially carcinogenic, environments. Poor 
people are genetically predisposed to X, Y, Z. It is related to the opioid crisis, because 
opioid abuse is more pronounced in small, rural communities? 
The true culprit is far more pedestrian. Observed kidney cancer rates are higher in 
rural counties because they have small populations. Small numbers equal extreme results. 
The same phenomenon explains why the lowest rate of kidney cancer in the United States 
can also be observed in poor, rural counties. The failure to examine the problem from an 
outside statistical perspective, as one might consider sampling effects from representative 
marbles drawn from a jar, is only one common judgmental error represented by 
Kahneman’s cancer question.176 The failure to consider the historic frequency of kidney 
cancer throughout the entire population prior to responding is representative of base-rate 
neglect.177 Seeking or assigning value to information based upon the extent to which it 
conforms to preconceived beliefs (i.e., poor people are superstitious) represents 
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confirmation bias.178 Subconsciously estimating the frequency of an event or the likelihood 
of culpability based upon the ease with which a representative example comes to mind (the 
opioid epidemic) is described as a heuristic of availability, which is often accompanied by 
the heuristic of attribute substitution, in which people attempt to answer a perceptually 
complex question by unwittingly substituting the response to a simpler question instead.179 
A default presumption that higher kidney cancer rates in rural counties is linked to human 
behavior rather than independent circumstances is representative of the fundamental 
attribution error.180 According to Kahneman, these illusions of knowledge persist because 
“we pay more attention to the content of the messages than to information about their 
reliability, and as a result end up with a view of the world around us that is simpler and 
more coherent than the data justify. Jumping to conclusions is a safer sport in the world of 
our imagination that it is in reality.”181 In each of the GJP online training modules presented 
over the course of the study, researchers provided forecasters with simple statistical and 
probabilistic reasoning principles.182 Forecasters also received information related to 
specific cognitive biases commonly found to impair judgmental accuracy, as well as 
recommended strategies to mitigate their impact.183  
5. Observed Training Outcomes 
In contrast to notable research studies dedicated to measuring the impact of various 
JDM training interventions published prior to the IARPA tournament, the GJP training 
study considered interactive effects beyond training, such as practice, feedback, and 
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experience, to measure their comprehensive influence over time. Before the beginning of 
the first year of the IARPA tournament (September 2011 through April 2012), forecasters 
randomly assigned to the training condition received a brief (~ one hour) block of on-line 
instruction designed to improve probabilistic estimates.184 Over the course of the following 
nine months, tournament officials tasked all of the GJP study participants (trained condition 
and non-trained control) with answering approximately 150 questions related to a topically 
diverse array of complex future geopolitical events. This provided members of the trained 
condition with an opportunity to immediately operationalize their training. Participants 
received constant feedback throughout the year in the form of Brier scores, which allowed 
them to assess and refine their analytic technique. The same process was repeated for each 
of the three remaining tournament years, which provided forecasters with significant 
experience and opportunities for learning.185 At the end of the fourth year, the IARPA 
tournament was closed. Welton Chang et al. analyzed the data and published the results. 
At the end of the first tournament year, forecasters randomly assigned to the trained 
condition outperformed untrained control members by 10%.186 At the end of the second 
year, the variation between the two groups rose to 12%.187 The effect was statistically 
significant throughout all four years of the tournament without regression. Overall, training 
accounted for ~ 10% of the accuracy variance observed between condition and control 
forecasters.188 To understand the deep significance of that superficially modest result, one 
might conjure the image of a university wherein every student’s GPA increased by one 
letter grade because he or she watched a 60-minute webinar during orientation. Now 
imagine that same result, occurring to every student, every year, for the following three 
years.  
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D. FORECASTER TRACKING: KEEPING SCORE 
Despite the money it costs, despite its importance in government decision-
making, the quality of so much forecasting remains untested, and therefore 
unknown. Forecasters never learn what they’re getting right and wrong. 
They never adjust what they’re doing to make their forecasts better.189 
—Authors Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner 
 
1. The Failure to Measure 
In EPJ, Tetlock surmised that one of the reasons experts, analysts, and pundits were 
able to make repeated, unambiguously inaccurate predictions about consequential future 
geopolitical events with impunity was because they were never called to task. No one was 
systematically tracking and reporting whether predicted events manifested into actual 
events. Tetlock observed, “Although there is nothing odd about experts playing prominent 
roles in debates, it is odd to keep score, to track expert performance against explicit 
benchmarks of accuracy and rigor.”190 This vacuum leaves the consumers of expert 
predictions free to assess the quality of an expert based upon purely subjective criteria, 
such as their ability to tell convincing stories, prestigious titles, academic clout, popularity, 
or the degree to which a narrative compliments or conforms with a consumer’s pre-
conceived worldview.191 This likewise frees experts from the otherwise exhaustively 
rigorous task of producing objectively accurate predictions of uncertain future events, in 
exchange for the comparatively simpler task of mollifying a constituent base of forecast 
consumers.192 
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Ted Knight: What did you shoot? 
Chevy Chase: Oh, I don’t keep score. 
Ted Knight: Then how do you compare yourself to other golfers? 
Chevy Chase: By height.193 
 
Dr. John McCreary, a prominent retired senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), recipient of the Presidential Rank Award, and editor of NightWatch, finds 
the same scoring void persists within the U.S. intelligence community (IC).194 According 
to McCreary, the failure to track and record the quality of analytic reports has resulted in 
accuracy rates for critical U.S. intelligence estimates that are “borderline criminal.”195 In a 
2017 e-mail to NPS professor and former Chief of Naval Intelligence Robert Simeral, 
McCreary reported that by his own measurements over a period beginning in 2006, the 
judgmental accuracy of forecasts prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 48%. Within 
that context, replacing the DIA with a dull quarter would be a defensible strategy. 
2. Delusions of Measurement  
The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of 
knowledge.196 
—Author K. S. Somesh 
 
The failure to quantitatively correlate anticipated outcomes with actual outcomes 
and adjust beliefs accordingly is certainly not limited to domains of intelligence, policy, or 
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public discourse. In A Failure of Risk Management, Douglas Hubbard, author and inventor 
of applied information economics, identified the catastrophic results of a broad range of 
high consequence events (natural disasters, aviation incidents, critical infrastructure 
failures, industrial accidents, economic calamities, etc.), which cluster around a single fault 
point; an organizational preference for perception over precision.197 In the preface of the 
book, Hubbard succinctly summarized the problem by saying “risk management based on 
actual measurements of risks is not the predominant approach of most industries.”198 Risk, 
according to Hubbard, is simply the likelihood that something bad could happen in the 
future, and management is the use of available resources to achieve a desired result.199 Risk 
management therefore, as described by Hubbard, is “the identification, assessment, and 
prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to 
minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events,” or 
alternatively, “being smart about taking chances.”200 
When Hubbard wrote about the failure of risk management, he was not only 
referring to the absence of any scientifically valid process for identifying and mitigating 
future threats. A portion of the book is dedicated to a more nuanced problem in which 
organizations “believe they have adopted an effective risk management method and are 
unaware that they haven’t improved their situation one iota.”201 Hubbard is referring to 
instances in which otherwise sophisticated groups overconfidently rely upon 
pseudoscientific methods of risk estimation for which there is “almost no experimentally 
verifiable evidence” that they actually work.202 Hubbard anecdotally recounted a national 
pharmaceutical conference he attended in 2007, in the wake of multiple high profile public 
safety incidents resulting from chemical production outsourcing to China.203 The attendees 
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were all experienced and well-credentialed scientists, chemists, and engineers. The agenda 
was comprised of technical presentations detailing specific chemical design, production, 
and packaging methodologies, all of which were accompanied by complex mathematical 
models. Skeptic attendees actively questioned or challenged every presenter’s assertion in 
a manner befitting professional scientists. The character of the convention hall changed 
dramatically when the topic transitioned to a new methodology for evaluating the risks 
associated with outsourcing drug manufacturing to China. The model was entirely based 
on a subjectively weighted scoring method utilizing a 1 to 5 scale across multiple 
categories. The weights, as well as the scores contained therein, were the sole product of 
opinions originating from a small, designated group within the company. Drugs that did 
not exceed a pre-specified threshold were deemed safe for outsourcing.  
At the end of a one-sided presentation, the sole question from the floor was offered 
by Hubbard, who laconically asked, “How do you know it works?”204 The precipitated 
silence was deafening, and did not abate. In contrasting the fervent academic pitch that 
permeated the hall prior to the outsourcing presentation with the viscous snake oil 
salesmanship thereafter, Hubbard sardonically remarked that the assembled mass of 
analytic aces had tacitly endorsed “an approach with no more scientific rigor behind it than 
an ancient shaman reading goat entrails” and further observed, “While the lack of such 
rigor would be considered negligent in most of their work, it was acceptable to use a risk 
assessment method with no scientific backing at all.”205 In the realm of forecasting future 
outcomes, overt negligence might take a back seat to comforting delusions. 
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3. Tracing the GJP Data Loop 
Data! data! data! he cried impatiently. I can’t make bricks without clay.206 
—British writer Arthur Doyle 
 
GJP’s goal in the IARPA tournament was to produce the most accurate predictions 
of complex future geopolitical events as was humanly possible. Over the course of four 
years, Tetlock’s crowdsourced team provided more than one million time series forecasts 
in response to approximately 500 questions posed by IARPA officials.207 The first question 
posed in the first year of the tournament was “Will the Six-Party talks (among the United 
States, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan) formally resume in 2011?”208 
The question was published on September 1, 2011, at which time GJP forecasters could 
submit a prediction via an online website in the form of a binary yes/no response 
accompanied by a confidence interval (e.g., 63% Yes). As long as the question remained 
open, forecasters could update their predictions as often as they chose based on (for 
example) evolving beliefs or the acquisition of new information deemed pertinent from 
any unclassified source (teammate conversations, Google, etc.). With each prediction, 
forecasters were encouraged to use the website to capture personal notes in order to 
memorialize the reasoning or thought process that precipitated the estimate. This facilitated 
a more detailed post-mortem analysis and provided additional insight for researchers. 
4. Aggregating and Averaging  
In 1989, Dr. Robert Clemen published a comprehensive literature review of more 
than 200 academic papers dedicated to prediction, which found unanimous consensus 
amongst all of the contributing researchers that “combining multiple forecasts leads to 
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increased forecast accuracy… Furthermore, in many cases one can make dramatic 
performance improvements by simply averaging the forecasts.”209 Accordingly, beginning 
on the morning of September 2, 2011, and continuing every day that the question was open 
thereafter, Tetlock and his team aggregated and averaged the predictions submitted by GJP 
forecasters and distilled them into a single best guess (in virtually the same manner as 
Galton more than a century before). 
5. Extremizing  
This simple algorithmic manipulation was the first step in GJP’s attempt to 
alchemically transmute lead into gold. The second step was a process dubbed extremizing. 
In a 2015 lecture to the American Enterprise Institute, Tetlock explained GJP’s rationale 
for extremizing predictions by asking attendees to imagine a room full of U.S. intelligence 
experts convened by President Obama in 2011 to present their individual estimates of 
whether the person inside a walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan was Osama bin 
Laden. Suppose the reported confidence level from every person in the room was 65%. 
Based on that, would it be reasonable for the President to conclude that there was a 65% 
chance that the tall figure was bin Laden? According to Tetlock, it depends. If the analysts 
had reached their individual conclusions after considering the exact same intelligence, then 
65% might represent the best possible guess. However, suppose that each contributor 
represented a different compartmentalized segment of the IC (human, signal, image, etc.) 
and had based their estimate exclusively upon the information available within their 
respective silo. Would 65% still represent the best possible guess? While it is impossible 
to know for certain, Tetlock suggested that the probability should be adjusted, or 
extremized, based upon the diversity of the inputs into the system. An analyst who reported 
a 65% likelihood based on the limited intelligence contained within his or her silo would 
almost certainly increase their level of confidence if the silos were destroyed and all of the 
information became available. Were that to happen, the President might reasonably 
conclude that the most accurate estimate is 70% or 75%, despite the fact that no individual 
advisor guessed above 65%. Tetlock surmised that the same phenomenon would apply to 
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GJP forecasters. In attempting to answer the Six-Party question, each forecaster could use 
any available unclassified source of information to produce a guess. As a result, it was 
impossible for one forecaster to know everything that all the other forecasters knew. If it 
were possible, then GJP’s collective confidence would increase and guesses would be 
adjusted a little bit closer to 100% or 0%. Extremizing then, is a way to simulate how a 
group’s estimate would react if all of the forecasters could pool and collectively understand 
all of the available information used by the entire GJP team. If the collective responses 
trend towards 100% or 0% when averaged, GJP simply nudged the final estimate a little 
more in proportion to the degree of the prevailing direction of the crowd (hence, forecasts 
that resulted in 70% yes when averaged are extremized more than forecast averages 
yielding 60% yes).  
At midnight (EST) on December 31, 2011, the Six Party question was closed. The 
following morning, GJP aggregated and averaged all of the forecasts submitted by its 
members to produce a single prediction, and then extremized the result (representing GJP’s 
official best guess), which was electronically transmitted to IARPA at 9:00 AM. On 
January 2, 2012, IARPA declared the correct answer to the question to be “no.”  
At this point, IARPA scored GJP’s performance using a method developed in 1950 
by statistician Glenn W. Brier.210 Originally designed to allow weather forecasters to assess 
the accuracy of weather predictions, IARPA used Brier scoring because it accounts for a 
prediction’s resolution (the event happened or did not happen) as well as calibration (the 
confidence interval assigned to whether a future event will happen or not). Simply put, a 
forecaster who predicts a 75 percent chance that a future event will take place will score 
much better than one who only placed the odds at 51%. A Brier score represents the degree 
of error in a forecast. To calculate a score, the forecasted probability of an event is divided 
by 100, so the result is between zero and one. The outcome of the event is then assigned 
either a 0 (did not happen) or a 1 (did happen). For each potential outcome, the differences 
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between the predicted outcome and the actual outcome are squared and then added together 
to obtain a score. For example, if a forecaster correctly assigns a 70% likelihood that an 
event will happen, the Brier score is .18, or the sum of (1-0.7)² + (0-0.3)². Brier scores can 
range between zero and two, with zero reflecting perfect clairvoyance.  
Brier scores allowed researchers to begin meticulously tracking the performance of 
every GJP forecaster over time. This feedback facilitated post-mortem analysis and enabled 
learning. Researchers publically posted the scores in online leaderboards so forecasters 
could compare their performance against other GJP forecasters, and teams could 
benchmark themselves against other teams.211 This facilitated recognition and competition, 
which is discussed in a subsequent section. 
6. Weighting 
Tracking and recording the performance of every GJP forecaster also facilitated the 
implementation of a third algorithmic manipulation, intended to work in concert with 
averaging and extremizing. As discussed in a preceding section, large groups of diverse 
forecasters are capable of producing accurate predictions because scraps of useful 
information are widely dispersed among group members, and inaccurate information is 
typically distributed randomly above and below the correct answer such that when 
averaged on a graph, good guesses gain resolution and bad guesses cancel one another out. 
While a group’s prediction is frequently more accurate than the best guess of any individual 
member, such is not always the case. Certainly there are instances in which a single 
member beats the group; however, over time it is unlikely that the same individual will 
come out on top. In the long run, given the option between consistently betting on one 
person or one group, smart money wagered on the group will pay out with greater 
frequency than bets placed on one individual, thereby making groups the better gamble. 
However, GJP’s terminal objective was not to produce better outcomes. Their goal was to 
produce the best possible outcome. Researchers surmised that while the same forecaster 
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was unlikely to consistently beat the group, performance tracking over time would reveal 
that the same sub-set of forecasters would perform at the top of the scale, representing a 
heretofore untapped resource ripe for exploitation to further improve GJP’s terminal 
accuracy. Tetlock et al. reasoned that some forecasters are better than others, and over time, 
the cream should rise to the top. This notion was subsequently well supported by David 
Budescu and Eva Chen in a paper entitled “Identifying Expertise and Using It to Extract 
the Wisdom of the Crowds.”212 When the follow-on to the Six Party question was opened 
by IARPA, GJP proceeded in exactly the same fashion as it had before; however, this time 
the responses from the forecasters at the top of the leaderboard were artificially weighted 
based upon the quality of their prior performance. Those weights were incorporated into 
the aggregated average, which was then extremized to produce a final GJP prediction that 
was transmitted to IARPA once the question was closed.  
7. Superteams 
The process of weighting, aggregating, averaging, and extremizing predictions 
continued in response to every question posed by IARPA for the duration of the first 
tournament year. After the first season of the IARPA tournament was concluded, GJP 
examined the cumulative performance of all forecasters and observed that a core 2% 
minority of the total group, dubbed superforecasters, had indeed consistently outperformed 
the rest.213 Researchers wanted to make further use of that feature as a means of extracting 
greater levels of accuracy from the system by re-grouping previously random teams into 
performance stratified teams. The prospect of doing so was not without risk.214 On one 
hand, there was a significant body of literature centered around student performance which 
held that cohorts grouped by superior ability performed better than those grouped 
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heterogeneously, largely owing to an accelerated learning effect.215 Alternatively, making 
forecasters aware that they had been anointed with the “super” label could produce 
debilitating arrogance or overconfidence.216 Researchers also looked for guidance beyond 
the established literature by informally asking recognized organizational experts for their 
opinions.217 The responses were “flatly contradictory.”218 Ultimately, Tetlock decided to 
roll the dice and reorganized all of the GJP teams according to past performance. As a 
result, prior to the start of the second season of the IARPA tournament, five superteams of 
12 forecasters each (representing the top 2% of performers from the previous year) were 
created. The resultant outcomes observed at the end of the second tournament year were 
wholly unanticipated. 
If the performance levels produced by superforecasters at the end of the first year 
were the product of luck rather than skill, it would be reasonable to expect them to regress 
towards the mean in year two. They did not.219 Tetlock would later liken the creation of 
superteams to a cognitive “steroid injection” for those forecasters who were already 
performing at the very top of the scale.220 GJP found, “On average, when a forecaster did 
well enough in year 1 to become a Superforecaster, in year 2 that same person became 50% 
more accurate. An analysis following year three produced the same result.”221 Researchers 
naturally wanted to broaden their understanding of the superteam phenomenon and its 
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mediating influence upon superforecasters in the form of an enriched learning 
environment, and to that end they had a valuable tool at their disposal. GJP forecasters 
were loosely networked via a purpose-built online website that captured all of their 
interactions. Researchers were able to use that platform to construct queries measuring 
superforecaster behaviors prior to and after the creation of superteams, as well as queries 
comparing superteam behaviors with those observed in top-teams (one performance tier 
below superteams) and all-other teams. For example, at the end of the third year of the 
IARPA tournament, GJP found that:222 
• First year superforecasters updated their beliefs twice as often as any other 
forecaster. The frequency doubled after they were pooled into superteams 
at the beginning of the second year, and the rate increased again in the 
third year. 
• The average number of questions attempted by superforecasters in the first 
year increased by 30% following placement within a superteam.  
• Between years two and three, superteams collected articles and performed 
Google keyword searches 400% more than other teams. 
• Between years two and three, superteams posted approximately 500% 
more question-specific comments than all other teams. 
• Comments posted by superteams between years two and three were 30% 
longer than those of all other teams. 
• Between years two and three, superteams shared question-relevant 
information with teammates in the form of article links and file 
attachments 10 times more frequently than other teams. 
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• Superteams asked their teammates twice as many questions as any other 
team, and were five times more likely to receive a response. 
In summary, GJP found that pooling forecasters into performance stratified teams 
created enriched environments that drove performance gains. For newly minted 
superforecasters who were already performing at the top of the charts, this superteaming 
effect produced significantly increased demonstrations of task motivation and 
commitment. Superforecasters assigned to superteams demonstrated a greater motivation 
to cultivate new skills, as well as increased levels of internal engagement, and a greater 
willingness to share knowledge. Members of superteams were more likely to ask 
teammates for help, and more likely to receive it. Overall, they reflected a higher degree of 
perceived accountability to one another. Each of these features was ultimately determined 
to be predictors of increased accuracy based upon tournament Brier scores.223  
Performance = Recognition = Engagement = Rigor = Learning = Performance 
In addition to facilitating the weighting, extremizing, and teaming methodologies 
employed by GJP to win the IARPA tournament, performance tracking fueled an additional 
feature that contributed to their ultimate success, forecaster recognition. Within GJP, 
accuracy was the only true currency, making public leaderboards “radically meritocratic” 
sources of healthy competition, acclaim, and validation amongst forecaster peers.224 The 
psychological impact of positive recognition was recently described by cognitive scientist 
turned professional poker player Annie Duke in her book, Thinking in Bets.225 Duke, now 
a world champion, recalled herself as a young proselyte player having just joined an elite 
group of successful, highly skilled players whose purpose (much like a superteam) was to 
help one another develop improved judgmental accuracy within the poker realm. 
Recognition within the group, and approval from it, exerted a narcotic influence on the 
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fledgling felt dweller. According to Duke, “I experienced firsthand the power of a group’s 
approval to reshape individual thinking habits. I got my fix by trying to be the best credit-
giver, the best mistake-admitter, and the best finder-of-mistakes-in-good-outcomes. The 
reward was their enthusiastic engagement and deep dives introducing me to the nuances of 
poker strategy. It was also rewarding to have these intelligent, successful players take my 
questions seriously and increasingly ask for my opinions.”226 
8. The Glory of GitHub 
There is something wonderfully human about the open-source community. 
At heart, it’s driven by a deep human desire for collaboration and a deep 
human desire for recognition and affirmation of work well done—not 
financial reward. It is amazing how much value you can create with the 
words “Hey, what you added is really cool. Nice job. Way to go!” Millions 
of hours of free labor are being unlocked by tapping into people’s innate 
desires to innovate, share, and be recognized for it.227 
—Writer Thomas Friedman 
 
Recognition is credited with the meteoric rise of a massive online open source 
software development platform. Launched in 2008, GitHub was a digital space designed 
to facilitate crowdsourced collaboration on software design projects in which anyone could 
contribute to the process or benefit from the proceeds.228 The passion for creative 
innovation and the tremendous effort exerted by programmers throughout the world to 
build products that no one could own was driven by the basic human need for positive peer 
recognition.229  
                                                 
226 Duke, 133. 
227 Friedman, Thank You for Being Late, loc. 1127. 
228 “GitHub Features: The Right Tools for the Job,” GitHub, accessed August 30, 2018, https:// 
github.com/features. 
229 Laura Dabbish et al., “Social Coding in GitHub: Transparency and Collaboration in an Open 
Software Repository,” in Proceedings of the ACM 2012 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work—CSCW ’12, ACM 2012 conference (Seattle: WA: ACM Press, 2012), 1277, https://doi.org/10.1145/ 
2145204.2145396. 
60 
New projects were born when someone uploaded a prototype design which any user 
could then experiment with, modify, expand, or improve. GitHub was completely 
transparent, such that every contribution was instantly attributable to its contributor, and 
all users could appraise the value of that specific contribution via a peer rating system. 
Good contributions were incorporated into the prototype, bad contributions were discarded, 
or alternatively portions of the prototype could be extracted and used to create wholly 
different projects. GitHub co-creator Chris Wanstrath described it as “a distributed version 
controlled system: anyone can contribute, and the community basically decides every day 
who has the best version… The best rises to the top by the social nature of collaboration—
the same way books get rated by buyers on Amazon.com.”230 Peer reviews at every step 
generated praise, criticism, conversations, and debate, which produced “a virtuous cycle 
for the rapid learning and improvement of software programs that drives innovation faster 
and faster.”231 In speaking about the source of GitHub’s success, Hewlett Packard 
President Meg Whitman simply said, “I am convinced that the world is driven by validation 
and that’s what makes these communities so powerful. People are driven by their desire 
for others in the community to validate their work.”232 
9. Ripping Warez: Piracy in High C  
In a relevant albeit unconventional vein, consider the feature that fanned the flames 
of the bonfire that was the illegal music trade that sparked to life in 1995. This same factor, 
ironically, would later reduce the towering pixelated pyre to a soggy pile of inert embers: 
recognition. As far back as the 1980s, Warez was a term ascribed to copyrighted digital 
media with copy protection barriers that had been cleverly circumvented to facilitate 
unlawful distribution, as well as the virtually connected network of people who produced 
and propagated the ill-got gains.233 An offshoot of the Warez piracy enterprise dedicated 
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exclusively to music eventually emerged following the rise of the internet and the creation 
of the ubiquitous MP3 file format. Colloquially and collectively referred to as the MP3 
scene, this subset quickly self-organized into distinct, socially interconnected release 
groups, with members located throughout the world.  
The end-to-end process of illicitly distributing contraband concertos was both labor 
and time intensive, but more critically, demanded tremendous technical skill and creativity. 
A notable characteristic of the MP3 scene was that, like GitHub, it was a non-monetary 
economy.234 The only currency of commerce was positive social performance feedback.235 
Individual and team performance metrics were measured and recorded based upon “the 
ability to continuously release new files before anyone else, preferably before the official 
release.” These accomplishments brought about positive social recognition and enhanced 
reputation for the individuals and teams responsible.236 Task specific roles within teams 
required specialization, such that they were compartmentalized and interdependent, 
making individual performance and group performance inextricably linked. This generated 
a “self-motivating virtuous cycle of intrinsic flow experiences, extrinsic rewards, and a 
‘copyfight’ culture stimulating feelings of spontaneous pleasure and a recurrent desire for 
more that powered participants’ passion for music and knowledge, and their emotional 
attachment to and identification with the scene, which, on their turn, reinforced members’ 
intrinsic and extrinsic motives for participation.”237 The recording industry responded to 
the revenue loss by initiating legal countermeasures and incorporating improved digital 
protections for their software. These required greater creativity, skill, and effort to 
overcome, which resulted in increased opportunities for acclaim, which improved pirate 
performance. In the face of steadily increasing (and well-funded) industry resistance, the 
recognition induced flow state initially described by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi in his book, 
Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, crescendoed the MP3 scene to a point in 
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2005 in which nearly 25,000 unique copyrighted songs were being released to the 
underground for free per month.238 Soon thereafter, the entire MP3 scene experienced a 
precipitous decline in productivity from that high-water mark which was brought about by 
advances in hardware and software.239 The process of producing counterfeit music became 
faster, more efficient, and easier. This de-skilling effect transformed praiseworthy into 
prosaic, and the engine that drove the industry sputtered, coughed, and died.  
10. Vivisecting Visionaries: The Cognitive Anatomy of a Superforecaster 
One final feature of performance tracking that merits consideration is that it 
provided researchers with the means to ask and answer a nagging question, are 
Superforecasters born or made? GJP forecasters completed a battery of standardized tests 
designed to measure various facets of cognitive ability, motivation, and style.240 
Researchers used univariate regression analysis of the independent variables produced by 
testing results, correlated with a dependent variable represented by each subject’s mean 
Brier score, to determine the extent to which each of the various quantifiable differences 
between individual forecasters contributed to the variance observed in predictive 
accuracy.241 All told, the answer to the nature/nurture question was a resounding: yes. 
The following variables were found to be consistent correlates for judgmental 
accuracy:242 
• Superforecasters are intelligent. Cognitive ability moderated accuracy and 
was a consistently significant performance predictor throughout the 
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tournament. These results are consistent with the collective output from 
decades of research.243 
• Superforecasters are numerate. This is not to say that all superforecasters 
are skilled mathematicians, only that they are generally more comfortable 
with thinking in numbers than their less accurate peers coupled with an 
affinity for probability.  
• Superforecasters are actively open-minded. They view beliefs as 
“hypothesis to be tested, not treasures to be guarded.”244 They search for 
contradictory evidence and are tolerant of ambiguity. They do not declare 
ideological allegiance to any tenet or ethos. Accuracy alone is sacred. All 
other beliefs are subject to revision based upon available evidence. The 
frequency with which forecasts were updated was a consistent predictor 
for accuracy throughout the tournament.  
• Superforecasters have a greater need for intellectual challenges. They are 
drawn to mental puzzles and problem solving. 
• Superforecasters are competitive and driven by competition for status and 
recognition, yet actively seek opportunities to share and collaborate, 
because it increases their odds of winning. 
• Superforecasters have a secular worldview and do not believe in pre-
deterministic perspectives that seek to attribute outcomes to fate or the 
supernatural. They understand and accept the role of randomness in the 
world. 
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One consistently observed trait in every superforecaster was the tenacious pursuit 
of self-improvement. None perceived judgment to be an innate, immutable commodity, but 
rather a skill that could be improved upon over time with sufficient diligence and practice; 
a state of mind referred to by Tetlock as “perpetual beta.”245 Are superforecasters born or 
made? The data supports both conclusions. Some forecasters are unquestionably much 
better than others. Innate dispositional characteristics like intelligence are vital and 
absolutely matter. That said, environmental factors, such as group diversity, performance 
stratified teams, training, practice, accountability, and recognition are transformative. 
Ignoring one aspect in deference to the other is perilous. Anyone who believes otherwise 
has exercised “demonstrably poor judgment.”246 
E. RECONSTRUCTING TETLOCK: IARPA RESULTS 
Once combined, the cumulative effects of teaming, training, and tracking produced 
remarkable outcomes.247 At the end of the first tournament year, GJP beat the IARPA 
control group by 60%. After year two, that number rose to 78%. At the end of the second 
year, GJP had also bested the other four university teams by 30–70%, which prompted 
IARPA to drop them from the tournament.248 GJP’s winning margins increased for each of 
the two remaining years of the tournament and was ultimately declared the victor. After 
more than one million predictions, GJP was found to be on the right side of maybe more 
than 86% of the time.249 Most astoundingly, a journalist later leaked a secret report that 
revealed that GJP “nobodies” armed only with Google beat an undisclosed shadow team 
of DNI professionals armed with classified intelligence by 30%.250  
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III. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
A. IMAGINING A SUPERFORECASTED SELECTION MODEL 
The goal of the following section is to construct a conceptual model representing 
how a superforecasted leadership selection process might function in practice, and then 
install it in the most optimal environment imaginable as a means of testing the hypothesis 
that it might work. A university classroom will serve as the backdrop for this exercise 
because it is instantly recognizable for most readers, and because classrooms are fairly 
static environments with readily measurable outputs. Also, university professors are 
reasonable analogies for leaders. Professors stimulate learning and engagement, provide 
vision, articulate goals, organize collective effort, drive performance, and reward 
achievement. Also, universities are currently facing some significant challenges and 
unintended consequences related to performance measurement that make them attractive 
candidates for inclusion in this thesis.  
1. An Admittedly Indulgent Primer on a Problem in Academia  
There is a longstanding and increasingly pervasive tension that exists within 
universities fomented upon the competing goals of teaching and research.251 Universities 
are generally charged with producing knowledge, so cultivating high quality, high impact 
scholarly research is a critical function. However, even the most intensively research-
focused institutions are expected to produce high quality students equipped with the 
requisite knowledge and critical thinking skills sufficient to further their respective fields 
and make a positive social contribution. The correlations observed between those different 
functions are not particularly strong.252  
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In recent years, a crescendoing call from public and private organizations for 
universities to refocus their priorities on a teaching mission has been raised, driven in part 
by the increased demand for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
professionals.253 Nevertheless, and despite most universities outward assertions of being 
student-centered institutions of higher learning, faculty continue to be hired, evaluated, 
rewarded, and promoted on the basis of research.254  
In a recent article for University World News, Philip Altbach and Hans de Wit 
suggest that the problem is magnified by national and global university ranking systems 
predicated solely upon perceptions of research prestige, leading to an isomorphic me too 
neurosis in which “most academic institutions want to resemble universities at the top of 
the academic pecking order.”255 This, the authors opine, has led to “a growing trend in 
doctoral education…to dispense with the traditional PhD dissertation and replace it with 
the requirement for doctoral students to publish several articles based on their research in 
academic journals.”256 By discarding dissertations for publications, universities hope to 
pump their rankings, thereby ostensibly pumping both research funding, and enrollment 
from students wishing to be associated with a perceptually prestigious institution. The 
result is a glut of submissions for publication from academics, leading to “a crisis in 
academic publishing—too much pressure on top journals, too many books of marginal 
quality, the rise of predatory journals and publishers that publish low or marginal quality 
research.”257 Academic journals have found themselves “buried in a barrage of papers,” 
which has in recent months led one respected publication (citing a two-year backlog) to 
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suspend acceptance of new submissions, a decision decried by some academia insiders as 
“unheard of” and “simply stunning.”258 
This overwhelming effect has rippled to peer review, considered by many to be an 
unassailable hallmark of academic rigor, integrity, and veracity.259 Consider, for example, 
one scorekeeping initiative undertaken of late by a team of 270 scientists from the Center 
for Open Science (COS) to validate “landmark” findings deemed statistically significant 
by 100 peer reviewed psychology studies, and published in three respected science 
journals.260 Nearly 70% of those findings did not replicate, resulting in an “acrimonious” 
(albeit not surprising) public outcry of indignation from the implicated parties.261 
Undeterred, COS responded by evaluating the findings in several leading economics 
publications (40% non-replicable), followed by a consideration of multiple “exciting, 
innovative and important” studies published in two different journals of high regard 
(Nature and Science). The latter endeavor revealed that over one third of those findings 
were not reproducible, and suffered from “false positives and inflated effect sizes” driven 
by “publication or reporting biases.”262 
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It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins 
to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.263 
The source of those biases, according to Carnegie Mellon researchers Leslie John, 
George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, may flow from a viciously erosive and self-
sustaining cycle. Universities, incentivized by the prospect of improved prestige rankings, 
drive faculty members to publish in ever-increasing volume in academic publications, 
which are dis-incentivized by virtue of volume to publish studies with negative results.264 
This, in turn, incentivizes academics to engage in questionable research practices, 
described as “steroids of scientific competition, artificially enhancing performance,” until 
the desired (and thereby publishable) positive result is achieved.265  
A powerfully blunt critique of the contemporary university landscape was recently 
tweeted by terrorism powerhouse Bruce Hoffman, who bemoaned “the hyperventilating 
publish or perish culture in academe & erosion of teaching in stampede to publish. 
Especially lamentable is proliferation of PhD degrees eschewing traditional dissertations 
in favor of a series of articles/papers.”266 Dr. Hoffman’s perspective is not benefitted by 
additional commentary from this writer.  
For universities that do consider faculty teaching performance, at least in part, the 
overwhelmingly dominant method of assessment has been end of term student evaluations, 
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which have in turn been resoundingly debunked as single-source assessment tools.267 Why 
then, in the face of such damning evidence, would otherwise incomparably astute 
institutions continue to knowingly rely upon an ineffective metric to make profoundly 
consequential decisions about a critical infrastructure?268 One erudite enclave of educators, 
including Dartmouth economist Douglas Staiger, politely suggest the reason may be driven 
by a heuristic of attribute availability, not unlike “the well-known story of a man looking 
for his keys under a street light—not because he dropped them nearby, but because that is 
where he can see.”269 
In response to the inefficacy of student evaluations as a single-source metric for 
professor proficiency, the RAND Corporation and others have called instead for an 
outcome based value added model (VAM), which seeks to track a teacher’s contribution 
to undergraduate learning via longitudinal exam performance throughout the course of a 
given class.270 This is a superficially attractive option, if for no other reason than it 
eliminates the subjectivity inherent in student opinion; however, much like end of course 
evaluations, it is not a method free from complication. John Ewing, then president of Math 
for America, enumerated a number of concerns related to VAM in a 2011 article published 
by the American Mathematical Society.271 Ewing suggests that scores are influenced by 
multiple environmental factors beyond teaching proficiency, such as peer dynamics and 
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parental support, which cannot be captured by an exam.272 Exams are only samples in a 
sense, much like polls, and therefore subject to the same snapshot statistical errors relating 
to the law of small numbers.273 Exams are tests of a student’s ability to learn facts and 
procedures; however, those tangible abilities are only a subset of learning objectives, which 
also include intangible attributes, such as “attitude, engagement, and the ability to learn 
further on one’s own,” which resist quantification.274 The most challenging aspect to 
overcome, according to Ewing, is inflation, or the inherent incentive for professors to 
provide students with effective test-taking strategies, “teach to the test,” or commit outright 
fraud, in the interest of boosting terminal performance ratings to advance career 
aspirations.275 
Compelling evidence suggests that the incentive aspect of Ewing’s objections 
should not be capriciously discounted. That finding was one of several from a study 
conducted at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) by Scott Carrell and James West.276 
The intent of the study was to consider VAM and student evaluations collectively as 
measures of professor performance within a given class, with the added consideration of 
student follow-on performance in a subsequent class (so calculus 101 in light of calculus 
201).277 This obvious yet previously unconsidered dimension shined new light on a dim 
space. The USAFA undergraduate student body is a well-suited testbed for objectively 
considering performance questions, because all students are randomly assigned to 
professors for 30 mandatory core courses covering mathematics, social sciences, 
engineering, basic sciences, and humanities, each utilizing a common syllabus.278 The 
tracked follow-on courses for each of the core disciplines are likewise mandatory and 
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randomized, thereby eliminating errors emanating from self-selection and attrition bias.279 
Another useful USAFA feature is that the exams are graded by a pool of professors within 
a given discipline, which allowed researchers to “rule out the possibility that professors 
have varying grading standards for equal student performance”280 It also ensured that 
“bleeding heart professors had no discretion to boost grades or to keep their students from 
failing their courses,” which thereby produced study results “driven by the manner in which 
the course is taught by each professor.”281 The data set used a diverse group of 10,534 
undergraduate students at the USAFA over a seven-year period (2000–2007), and the 
output was derived from data extracted from 2,820 separate classes taught by 421 unique 
professors.282 The performance of professors teaching introductory courses was measured 
by student scores in contemporaneous core classes, student end of course evaluations, and 
subsequent student scores in tracked follow-on courses. 
Not surprisingly, Carrell and West observed that there were significant and 
substantial differences in student scores in both contemporaneous and follow-on classes.283 
Some students performed better than others. There was a correlation between student 
performance in a contemporaneous class and the manner in which a student rated the 
quality of the professor who taught that course.284 Students with higher grades awarded 
professors with higher performance evaluations. Thus, professors with higher 
contemporaneous class averages are identified by students as being better teachers than 
those with lower class averages. Viewed in a bubble, this result appears to support the 
argument that student evaluations are a defensible means of measuring the quality of a 
teacher. This is the point at which Carrell and West shine, because the study further 
revealed, “student evaluations are positively correlated with contemporaneous professor 
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value-added and negatively correlated with follow-on student achievement.”285 The 
inverse was also true. Professors of contemporaneous courses who teach to the test produce 
students with higher scores who in turn reward professors with higher performance 
evaluations. The facet that is not captured by either contemporaneous metric is deep 
learning, or the professor’s contribution to a student’s understanding of a topic or discipline 
beyond that which is required to achieve an acceptable score on a specific exam. Deep 
learning is rigorous, and requires greater effort from both students and professors, but the 
payoff is improved understanding resulting in better performance in follow-on courses. In 
considering all of the available data, the study found that overall, individual professors 
“significantly affect student achievement in both the contemporaneous course being taught 
and the follow-on related curriculum.”286  
In summary, teachers matter, and some teachers are better than others. Status quo 
evaluations seeking to measure the quality of a professor’s performance in the vacuum 
space of a single metric are specious and ill-advised. Incentives are important aspects of 
teacher performance evaluation systems and demand careful consideration. Predicting how 
a candidate for a teaching position observed today will perform tomorrow is a complex 
multivariate task in which cause and effect are not tightly bound. It is unlikely that any 
expert would possess the requisite knowledge to consistently make accurate predictions. It 
is considerably more likely that small portions of useful information are broadly dispersed, 
such that one person might have one scrap and a different person may hold another. A 
professor selection system that aggregates and averages the beliefs of a large, diverse group 
of forecasters should outperform the status quo. A selection system that tracks and reports 
the correlations between anticipated outcomes and actual outcomes will create a closed 
data feedback loop, which should produce gradually improved outcomes over time. 
2. An Educated but Nonetheless Imperfect Best Guess 
Imagine that a large American research college dubbed Jasper State University 
(home of the Scarlett Knights) has initiated an audacious, but not wholly unprecedented, 
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plan to create a new class of full-time professors dedicated to teaching core curriculum 
classes to the undergraduate student body.287 If hired, this new faculty segment’s sole task 
will be to produce the highest performing students possible, and future promotions will be 
dependent upon demonstrations of “excellence and leadership in education.”288 
JSU’s first step is to recruit a large, diverse group of forecasters from its current, 
full-time employees in any rank or position; department chairs, HVAC technicians, 
physical therapists, or librarians. If warranted, JSU might broaden its recruitment pool to 
include alumni and retirees. The only prerequisite is a bachelor’s degree from an accredited 
institution to reasonably ensure basic literacy. Such an initiative will require the digital 
distribution of an open solicitation which includes an overview of the initiative, as well as 
a compelling value proposition directly from the Chancellor emphasizing JSU’s 
commitment to a radical, cutting-edge strategy designed to best prepare today’s students 
for tomorrow’s challenges. It should stress the opportunity for forecasters to test their 
cognitive mettle against the university’s brightest minds in a meritocratic competition for 
meaningful recognition and greater civic good. Those who volunteer should do so with the 
understanding and expectation that they will receive ongoing training, support, and 
feedback while working collaboratively in teams of likeminded high-performers to better 
themselves, their school, and their community.  
Once recruited, the forecasters will initially be randomly assigned to 10-person 
teams and loosely networked via a secure online Moodle platform designed to facilitate 
and memorialize forecaster interactions.289 Once the teams are established, forecasters will 
complete an online block of instruction designed by JSU. Modeled after GJP’s CHAMPS 
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KNOW series, this course will serve as a best-practice guide for university forecasters, 
with graphically supported interactive segments relating to:  
• Probabilistic reasoning 
• Bayesian belief updating and Fermi estimations 
• Common bias and heuristics errors and effective mitigation tactics 
• Strategies to maximize the benefits of teams and overcome groupthink 
• Strategies to test beliefs via Red Teaming and pre- and post-mortem 
analysis 
Each segment will conclude with a knowledge check to allow forecasters to 
evaluate their understanding of the materials. The proceeding portion of the training will 
detail the means by which forecaster performance is to be measured, tracked, and reported, 
in addition to the method for measuring professor performance (discussed below). This 
includes an explanation of forecaster outcome accountability, as well as an overview of 
Brier scoring. The final segment will contain instructions to access a living list of shared 
reference links within the platform which forecasters can use and build upon in perpetuity 
to improve their understanding of a relevant topic area. The reference page will incorporate 
a feedback component, allowing forecasters to rate and comment upon the utility of a given 
resource, and might initially include links to recommended JDM research, GJP 
supeforecaster interviews, guidelines published by the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology (SIOP), or publications from the Yale Center for Teaching and 
Learning.290 
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3. Data Input via Recruitment and Vetting 
Once forecaster teams are established and trained, JSU then begins the process of 
recruiting applicants for teaching positions by distributing announcements for each of the 
core disciplines via status quo channels reflecting the new pedagogical focus. Applicants 
must possess a master’s degree (MA) or Ph.D. from an accredited institution and may 
request consideration by submitting traditional documents to an online recruitment system, 
including a cover letter, curriculum vitae (CV), and any papers, published articles, other 
materials deemed by the applicant to be reflective of teaching excellence. In lieu of a 
research statement, applicants should submit a teaching statement which details teaching 
achievements, future goals, and concrete proposals for improving the quality of 
undergraduate education. Finally, all applicants must consent to a biometric criminal 
history query encompassing the United States and any foreign countries of residence. 
Upon receipt of a complete electronic application packet, JSU human resources 
(HR) staff will perform an initial sift to verify that that the candidate meets minimum 
eligibility requirements. Next, an electronic copy of the packet is made and both files are 
assigned a unique digital tracking number. The original file (identity file) is encrypted and 
secured such that it cannot be altered. The duplicate application packet then undergoes an 
anonymization process, whereby any data which might identify the applicant’s identity, 
gender, age, race, orientation, etc. is redacted. The anonymized file (forecaster file) is also 
encrypted and secured to prevent modification. 
4. Narrowing the Candidate Pool 
It is unreasonable for JSU, or any other large organization, to shoulder the time and 
expense of extensively vetting every eligible candidate for every open position, which is 
why all organizations have some mechanism (valid or not) for culling the best qualified 
from the merely qualified. It is at this point that university search committees, typically 
comprised of senior faculty and administrators, would begin to subjectively sort through 
CV piles and order-rank perceived potential; an unreliable process predicated upon 
storytelling and expert intuition. For any organization that requires a valid, legally 
defensible, single-metric mechanism to narrow a candidate pool, the literature 
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overwhelmingly supports general cognitive ability (GCA).291 To date, following numerous 
independent studies, GCA is the single most reliable predictor of future workplace 
performance potential for any job type.292 There are several standardized commercial 
instruments designed to measure GCA; however, JSU will use the Miller Analogies Test 
(MAT).293 The MAT is broadly relied upon to screen candidates for admission to graduate 
schools and MENSA.294 Further, a meta-analytic study conducted by Nathan R. Kuncel, 
Sarah A. Hezlett, and Deniz S. Ones found the MAT is a valid predictor for “academic and 
vocational criteria, as well as evaluations of career potential and creativity.”295 The MAT 
can accommodate persons with disabilities, and because the results are maintained for five 
years, many candidates will already possess a valid score at the time of application. For 
those that do not, the test is available throughout the world and requires no more than one 
hour to complete. Candidates with MAT scores in the 90% percentile or above may 
progress to a structured interview. 
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5. Structured Interviews (Version 2.0) 
One absolutely cannot tell, by watching, the difference between a .300 hitter 
and a .275 hitter. The difference is one hit every two weeks.296 
—Author Michael Lewis 
 
In his 2003 book, Moneyball, Michael Lewis tells the tale of Billy Beane, the 
general manager of the Oakland Athletics, whose talent spotting acumen was fueled by one 
rule, never meet the talent. Surrounded by a sea of competing teams fervently devoted to 
the belief that their scouting instincts and expertise were the only keys to success, Beane 
quietly built multiple high performance teams on a shoestring budget, by recruiting players 
that others passed over because they did not conform to their concept of what a pro player 
should look like. Rather than watching a prospect perform and intuitively rating the 
performance, Beane built a predictive model, populated it with the player’s performance 
statistics, and followed the data to a decision.297 In a similar vein, symphonies around the 
world have dramatically improved audition outcomes by simply introducing an opaque 
screen into the equation so raters cannot observe the rated.298 Years ago, Paul Meehl 
wagered that in a contest between doctors who can see patients, and computers who cannot, 
the smart money was on the machine; resulting in a longshot payout that continues to bear 
fruit.299 Across multiple domains, the song remains the same. Most experts believe they 
can spot the goods. Most experts are wrong.  
In light of the above considerations, JSU candidates who successfully hurdle the 
MAT will proceed to a structured interview stage conducted in strict conformation with 
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industry standard guidelines established by SIOP, with one significant variation.300 Those 
tasked with evaluating a candidate’s interview performance will never see, hear, or speak 
with the candidate. Traditionally, interview panelists have two tasks, ask candidates job-
related questions, and rate the quality of the responses received. JSU’s method will use 
trained panelists drawn from appropriate university staff, who are exclusively responsible 
for eliciting the best possible information from every interview. In order to provide 
additional data points and promote interviewer buy-in, panelists are encouraged to notate 
their opinions about each candidate; however, forecasters may ultimately incorporate or 
disregard those beliefs at their discretion. All interviews are digitally recorded and 
transcribed into a text document (along with panelist notes), which is then anonymized, 
encrypted, and digitally merged with the candidate’s forecaster file. 
6. Data Processing and Output via Selection Forecasting 
At this point in the process, every candidate has an anonymized file identified by a 
unique tracking number, which is digitally linked to an identity file. Anonymized files are 
populated with a CV and cover letter, a teaching statement with supporting documents, as 
well as an interview transcript with associated panelist notes. The anonymized files are 
then chunked into three sub-files (CV, teaching statement, and interview), which are 
randomly distributed to forecasters via the Moodle website. Working collectively with their 
assigned teams in a virtual environment, each forecaster is tasked with evaluating the 
contents of every sub-file and answering one question. If the candidate associated with this 
portion were selected for a position, would he or she receive a performance rating of at 
least 80% following two consecutive teaching semesters? Every forecast requires a binary 
yes/no prediction, accompanied by a confidence interval, so a forecaster evaluating a 
candidate’s CV might predict YES 64% or NO 33%. Throughout this stage, forecasters are 
strongly encouraged to memorialize their thought processes and beliefs within the Moodle 
platform. Doing so will establish a cognitive crumb trail to help evaluate the quality of their 
judgments (and avoid hindsight bias) once feedback is available. In evaluating the 
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interview transcripts, forecasters are likewise encouraged to notate their beliefs about the 
quality of the questions and the panelists. What information was or was not helpful? Are 
there questions that were not asked that should be incorporated into subsequent interviews? 
Are there opportunities to improve? To better visualize the flow, imagine five candidates 
for a JSU professor position. Each candidate has an anonymized file chunked into three 
sub-files, for a total of 15 sub-files. Those sub-files are randomly shuffled and digitally 
distributed to 100 forecasters. Every forecaster will evaluate the contents of each and 
submit 15 predictions, one for each sub-file, resulting in a combined total of 1,500 
predictions to fill one position. The predictions for every sub-file are aggregated and 
averaged, producing three separate predictions for each candidate, which are aggregated 
and averaged again to derive a final estimate of future performance representing the 
collective wisdom of the crowd. The candidate with the highest performance prediction is 
awarded the position, begins the onboarding process, and proceeds to the lectern. This 
process repeats as necessary throughout the first year to fill every professor position 
announced by JSU for its core curriculum classes.  
7. Measurement via Performance Management 
The quality of a process can be determined by measuring the relationship between 
an anticipated outcome and an actual outcome. The resulting correlation represents critical 
feedback data that facilitates calibration in order to gradually produce better subsequent 
outcomes over time. This is true of engineering, chemistry, computer science, and 
personnel selection. For JSU, measuring and thereby improving the performance of its 
forecasters requires judging the performance of new professors by measuring outputs from 
the classrooms they were tasked to lead. 
End of term student assessments are ineffective single-source metrics of professor 
performance because they are tremendously noisy instruments and the static overwhelms 
the signal, but valuable signal nonetheless resides therein. Assessments can capture the 
degree to which students perceive themselves to be engaged with the subject material and 
other less tangible classroom effects that impact learning, but are not necessarily reflected 
by raw test scores alone. Conversely, a value-add approach which only considers 
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longitudinal raw scores is equally undesirable as a solitary metric for largely the same 
reasons, but likewise carries valuable signals of professor performance. Both 
methodologies are also burdened by erosive incentivization issues which are ultimately 
harmful to students beyond the contemporaneous class, which must be confronted if the 
ultimate goal is longtime student learning and future societal contribution capacity. An 
admittedly appealing option would be to follow the surefooted path blazed by Carrell and 
West in their USAFA study by incorporating student follow-on performance; however, two 
years is too long and feedback delayed is feedback denied. How then to proceed? In their 
2011 study, Rockoff et al. observed that “While no single metric we examine has the ability 
to reliably identify large differences in teacher effectiveness, we document these metrics 
can be used to create composite measures…which have statistically significant 
relationships with student achievement.”301 This finding parallels the foundational work of 
Clemen and others, thereby collectively lending credence to an old axiom, Don’t throw out 
the baby with the bathwater.302 JSU then will measure professor performance by 
aggregating and averaging the outputs produced by three measurements over the course of 
one academic year to form a composite reflection of anticipated outcome versus actual 
outcome.  
The first measure is VAM, representing student scores for every core curriculum 
class taught by the new professor, and in a manner reflecting the professor’s discretion, 
over the course of two consecutive semesters. The second measure is a 10-question end of 
term assessment designed to measure the extent to which a student’s perception of class 
outcomes conforms with JSU expectations. Typically, such assessments require students 
to respond to each item using a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
on the historical belief that people are only capable of discerning meaningful distinctions 
or degrees of ambiguity using coarse ordinal scales. That belief may not be universally 
accurate.  
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One underappreciated finding of the GJP study reported by Jeffrey Friedman et al. 
was, “coarsening numeric probability assessments in a manner consistent with common 
qualitative expressions…consistently sacrifices predictive accuracy.”303 GJP researchers 
arrived at this conclusion by evaluating 888,328 probability assessments submitted by 
forecasters using a 1–100 confidence scale, and then artificially coarsening each prediction 
to conform with various status quo scales by rounding to the nearest interval bin.304 Once 
the bins were populated, the Brier scores were recalculated. This exercise was repeated 
multiple times using three-, five-, and seven-point scales. Without exception, researchers 
found that coarsening “sacrifices meaningful information” and decreases accuracy.305  
With this insight in hand, JSU will break with tradition and allow students to 
respond to each question using a 100-point scale as a means of imparting greater 
granularity, and thereby, in theory, capturing a greater portion of the available signal. At 
the end of an academic year, the results of the assessments will be aggregated and averaged 
first longitudinally, and then latitudinally, to produce a single cumulative result. A new 
professor teaching three core curriculum classes to 50 students per semester would produce 
300 assessments comprised of responses to 10 questions, for a combined total of 3,000 data 
points. The mean value for each assessment item is calculated to produce 10 values, which 
are averaged again to produce a final result representing the collective perceptions of all 
students.  
JSU will use a third and final measurement which is purpose-built to mitigate the 
incentive problem in the form of a blind exam. Studies have concluded that rating 
professors by either student evaluations or VAM creates the potential for teachers to inflate 
results by making students happy. This might include a range of manipulations, including 
teaching to a test, diminished workloads, eschewing instruction designed to promote deep 
learning, lenient grading, or possibly fraud. One way to check this problem might be to 
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limit a professors’ pedagogical discretion by mandating the use of a generic syllabus or 
standardized tests, but doing so limits a professors’ academic freedom to teach and 
experiment in the classroom to the extent of her or his ability, and runs counter to the 
objectives served by acquiring high-performance professors in the first place. Accordingly, 
new JSU professors will be afforded absolute discretion over every aspect of student 
instruction save one, the final exam. At the end of each semester, every core curriculum 
class taught by a new professor will receive an exam which is collectively written and 
graded by follow-on professors, representing their estimation of the requisite knowledge 
and understanding required for success in the subsequent class. For new professors, this 
exam represents a blind process for which they have no knowledge or input. 
8. Feedback 
At the end of the first academic year, the three measurements (value-add, student 
evaluations, and the blind exam) are combined and averaged to produce a composite 
performance rating. This is an unquestionably imperfect rating process, but nonetheless 
superior to the single-metric solutions employed by universities today. Once the rating is 
obtained, Brier scores representing forecaster accuracy can be computed and fed back to 
the Moodle platform. Doing so sets several wheels in motion. It populates a leaderboard, 
which publicly ranks the performance of every forecaster and every team as a means of 
spurring rigor via recognition and competition. It also allows forecasters to evaluate the 
quality of their judgments and identify errors or opportunities for improvement. Rankings 
enable team rosters to be re-shuffled using a performance stratification scheme. Brier 
scores can be used to weight the value of a forecaster’s subsequent prediction based upon 
the degree of accuracy observed in their prior performance. Hence, a forecaster who was 
10% above the mean yesterday will have the value of a subsequent prediction increased by 
that same margin. All of the forecasters’ comments and suggestions pertaining to the 
quality of the information produced by the interviews can be fed back to administrators as 
a means of identifying opportunities to improve the questions. Prior to the start of the next 
academic year, the new teams will complete another online block of training, and the 
process begins again. 
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9. Outcomes  
The net result for JSU is a superforecasted selection process for new professors 
predicated upon the understanding that its underlying assumptions might be wrong, and 
must, therefore, be constantly tested and updated based upon new information. 
Transforming professors into distributed data-producing sensor arrays produces feedback, 
which can be used to correlate predicted outcomes with actual outcomes. This facilitates 
calibration via learning. Superforecasting enables the university’s hiring system to identify 
mistakes in judgment and correct them in order to make better subsequent decisions. It is 
the creative application of the scientific method to personnel selection.  
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IV. PROBLEMS, BARRIERS, AND ISSUES FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Those who believe that what you cannot quantify does not exist also believe 
that what you can quantify, does.306 
—Author Aaron Haspel 
 
A. METRIC MISMANAGEMENT 
The contemporary challenges and unintended consequences associated with how 
institutions of higher learning measure performance tell a cautionary tale of organizational 
dysfunction that will likely strike a resonant chord with many readers. Two valuable 
lessons can be drawn from the text. First, incomparably intelligent and well-intended 
organizations are not immune to profound judgmental flaws, and where issues of 
confidence are concerned, may actually be more susceptible to error if left unchecked. 
Second, numbers can be dangerous, even deadly, and the cascade effects of metric 
mismanagement can spread like a virus. DHS and many other organizations rely on the 
collective output from universities to guide and inform consequential decision-making; 
thus, a performance system that incentivizes volume over veracity raises some 
uncomfortable questions. 
Universities, however, do not occupy the sole seat at the table of unintended 
consequences. In a recently published book entitled, The Tyranny of Metrics, historian 
Jerry Muller identifies a number of institutions whose pernicious use of performance 
metrics has resulted in suboptimal outcomes. In law enforcement, the collection and use of 
data has been invaluable as a means of resource allocation, trend mapping, and 
organizational learning which has been increasingly leveraged in recent years to great 
effect. However, statistics have also been political implements used to sway public 
perception or bolster reputational currency, producing a trickle-down effect that 
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incentivizes gamification in the form of underreporting, downgrading, or effort 
diversion.307 Such manipulations formed the basis for the fictionalized story arc presented 
in the award-winning HBO series The Wire.308 Muller suggests another example in the 
Vietnam era U.S. military, and the influence of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, a 
career accountant, who established metrics of success predicated upon bomb drops and 
body counts.309 
All who drink of this treatment recover in a short time, except those whom 
it does not help, who all die. It is obvious, therefore, that it fails only in 
incurable cases.310 
One of the most illustrative fields regarding the duality of metrics is medicine. Until 
rather recently (in historical terms), it was an industry driven by intuition, superstition, 
personality, and perception, such that “it was not unusual for a sick person to be better off 
if there were no physician available because letting an illness take its natural course was 
less dangerous than what a physician would inflict.”311 This state of affairs persisted until 
the 20th century, when the introduction of objective observations to correlate anticipated 
outcomes with actual outcomes via randomized experimentation dramatically accelerated 
advancement within the field. The flip side of that coin, however, can be observed in some 
modern medical institutions and the use of performance metrics represented by report cards 
or star-ratings as single-source forms of physician or facility accountability. According to 
Muller, whether well-intended or not, these measures have incentivized the gamification 
of the process, leading to (for example) case selection bias from risk-averse physicians, or 
hospitals leaving patients in ambulances to stall the clock in response to a performance 
metric measuring admittance wait times.312 
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Measurement is not a panacea. Many groups serve multiple purposes. It is 
impossible to measure every aspect of a group’s performance, and measuring one or two 
facets may be an invitation to neglect other important group functions. The virtue of a 
closed-loop data feedback network like the one created by a superforecasting model is its 
capacity to enable a group to identify errors and learn from mistakes, which stimulates 
learning. Conversely, utilizing metrics as a means to punish, sway opinion, boost 
reputation, or support a narrative will likely incentivize bad behavior. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL RETICENCE 
Superforecasting is a process predicated upon failure and an institutional 
acceptance of the fact that it is going to be wrong. Forecasting is, in part, dependent upon 
negative outcomes to stimulate learning, so the acceptance of a fail forward mindset prior 
to implementation is critical.313 Eighty percent predictive accuracy in domains of 
complexity is an amazing mark to attain. However, 80% right is still 20% wrong, meaning 
that a highly skilled team of superforecasters is going to miss the mark one time in five. 
For organizations accountable for the effective stewardship of public funds, the notion of 
intentionally adopting a process that is going to result in failures may be a difficult barrier 
to breach. 
Adopting a superforecasting model for leadership selection would also require 
existing leaders to completely abdicate control of a powerful hallmark of authority, the 
ability to promote (and thereby reward) subordinates, and transfer that capacity to a 
distributed network of unknowns. For leaders whose identity is inextricably intertwined 
with the social perception of themselves as horse borne battlefield commanders decisively 
waging war, rather than McChrystal’s model of a holistic gardener organically cultivating 
the organizational capacity for greatness to spring and prosper, relinquishing the reins will 
be a challenging proposition to accept, in spite of its value.314  
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C. THE ROAD NOT TRAVELLED 
Tetlock’s forecasters predicted future outcomes of highly complex geopolitical 
events. Feedback in the form of a Brier score represented the variation between what a 
forecaster believed would happen and what actually happened. Thus, forecasters worked 
in a truly dichotomous environment in which the only possible outcomes were yes or no, 
and judgments could be accurately assessed as a means of confirming mental models or 
identifying flaws. A superforecasted leadership selection system could only assess 
outcomes directly associated with the proceeds of the process. What about the candidates 
who were not selected for promotion?  
Such counterfactual questions are important points for consideration. If a candidate 
ultimately performed well in conformation with a forecaster’s prediction, then a Brier score 
reflecting good judgment is awarded and a forecaster can update beliefs accordingly. 
However, consider the possibility that an overlooked candidate for promotion would have 
performed better, had she or he been chosen. If that were to be true, then the forecaster 
actually made a mistake and exercised poor judgment. Without a means of accurately 
assessing all possible outcomes, it is impossible to know. This gap is not completely 
dispositive, because the extent to which a prediction correlates to an outcome remains an 
opportunity for learning; it simply means that learning potential is mediated by a network’s 
capacity to observe all potential outcomes.  
D. QUALITATIVE TASKS RESIST QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT 
Some group functions and outputs are more measureable than others. Additionally, 
the work product of some groups is wholly qualitative. For DHS, meaningfully measuring 
the performance of U.S. Air Marshals tasked with securing America’s airways, or members 
of U.S. Secret Service protective details, would be a futile exercise. Conversely, other 
groups with more process-oriented missions, such as instructor cadre at the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center, or security screeners within the Transportation Security 
Administration, produce observable outcomes which more readily lend themselves to 
measurement.  
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E. A STATISTICAL CONUNDRUM 
The final barrier to implementing a superforecasting model for leadership selection 
is also the most intractable. This thesis suggests that group performance should be a proxy 
for leadership performance. However, even if the problems associated with qualitative 
measurement could be reasonably surmounted, most groups are not large enough to 
produce statistically significant results. Many leaders in DHS (and virtually every other 
organization) only supervise a handful of employees. Small samples produce extreme 
results and are not suitable for use as a basis for learning. Increasing the ratio of employees 
to leaders to conform to the laws of statistics would produce teams so large that effective 
leadership would be an impossible task. Without accurate feedback, forecasters could never 








No plan survives first contact. That sentiment was originally espoused by Prussian 
commander Helmuth von Moltke to describe the military’s essential acceptance of the fact 
that no strategy will ever align with the inherent complexities of war. Moltke’s adage could 
also aptly account for the circuitous trajectory of a thesis propelled by a theoretical exercise 
in belief updating. 
DHS has a leadership problem. The IC has an analysis problem. Examining root 
causes for both conditions at a network level revealed surprisingly congruent fundamental 
design flaws relating to measurement, structure, and decision-making. The GJP started 
with a question. How can an organization make the best possible predictions of complex 
future events? That question evolved into a loosely held belief that a large, diverse group 
of crowdsourced forecasters would be more accurate than any other predictive 
methodology. Tetlock used the IARPA tournament to test that belief and refine it over time 
by following the outputs from a series of controlled experiments. The final product was 
superforecasting, which harnesses the capacity for algorithmically enhanced groups to 
evolve through diversity, training, performance stratification, feedback, recognition, and 
accountability. Tetlock’s recipe was not perfect, but it was far better than the IC’s status 
quo. 
The causal overlaps for the flaws observed in geopolitical analysis and leadership 
selection suggested a novel possibility. DHS could use a superforecasting methodology to 
improve its leadership selection decisions in the same manner that GJP used 
superforecasting to make better geopolitical predictions. That assumption launched an 
exploratory thought experiment that synthesized the relevant literatures into a technical 
manual of sorts, to deconstruct Tetlock’s machine and understand the mechanisms of 
operation. The following chapter modified the motor for personnel selection and installed 
it in the most advantageous environment imaginable to gauge its odds of success. Finally, 
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a Red Team of wrench-bearing monkeys was loosed to probe for weakness and foul the 
gears. They proved to be annoyingly shrewd simians. 
Would superforecasting work part and parcel for DHS leadership selection 
systems? No. At least, not in a way that would make it generalizable for every workgroup. 
The problems associated with qualitative measurement, small numbers, and 
counterfactuals are beyond this writer’s capacity to overcome.  
The question, however, was not asked in vain. The process of exploring that loosely 
held belief to an unexpected result produced valuable insights that still make a positive 
contribution to the problem space. Tetlock’s motor might not be a perfect theoretical fit for 
this specific application, but now that the mechanism is understood, component pieces can 
be disassembled and put to work for DHS.  
This thesis identified systemic flaws in the DHS leadership selection process, and 
offers several concrete recommendations that can be implemented to produce better 
organizational outcomes. It also lays a crumb trail for others to follow, and potentially build 
upon. That is an acceptable result.  
Leaders matter, and some leaders are better than others. Were that not true, 
organizations could forego the time and expense of a selection process and choose leaders 
by flipping coins or drawing straws. Leaders are born and made. Focusing on development 
at the expense of selection is an indication of poor judgment. Even marginal improvements 
to the way organizations choose leaders can pay a substantial dividend. Leadership 
selection is a complex domain in which cause and effect are not tightly bound. Were that 
not true, status quo leadership selection systems would produce optimal outcomes. Experts 
thrive in complicated domains and perform poorly in domains of complexity. Misapplying 
complicated solutions to complex problems will produce poor outcomes. Leadership 
selection is a prediction, an educated but nonetheless imperfect belief about how a 
candidate observed today will perform tomorrow. Beliefs are theories to be tested, not 
treasures to be cherished, and should be constantly updated based upon the best available 
data. Closed loop data systems perform better than open loop systems because correlating 
anticipated outcomes with actual outcomes generates feedback, which enables the learning 
93 
required to produce better subsequent decisions. Without feedback, decision makers are 
free to presume that all of their decisions are good decisions. This creates an environment 
not unlike a petri dish, where cognitive biases and bad heuristics can flourish. Good 
training is an excellent inoculant and good feedback is the best disinfectant. Searching for 
ways that leadership selection systems can learn and produce progressively better outcomes 
is a worthwhile endeavor. 
What organizations think is far less important than how.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If you don’t know where you’re going, you might end up somewhere 
interesting.315 
—Naval Postgraduate School professor Christopher Bellavita 
 
1. Improving the DHS Leadership Selection Process 
• Stop focusing on leadership development at the expense of selection. To 
date, DHS has essentially exerted tremendous effort chasing an errant 
group of horses around a pasture to which they should not have been 
admitted. DHS should stop running and build a better barn door. Some 
leadership candidates are better than others, so even modest improvements 
to the predictive accuracy of the selection process can pay significant 
organizational dividends.  
• DHS must disabuse itself of the notion that experts can intuitively identify 
good leaders when they see them. They cannot. The moment that any 
expert successfully solves the cause/effect selection puzzle in a manner 
that is replicable and reliable, the multi-billion dollar leadership industry 
will cease to exist. Until then, leadership selection remains a complex task 
for which experts are ill-suited. A large, cognitively diverse group of 
                                                 
315 Christopher Bellavita, “NPS-CHDS Capstone Lecture” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, October 5, 2018). 
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trained selection officials will produce better outcomes over time than a 
small homogenous group of experts. 
• Every employee tasked by DHS with evaluating the future performance 
potential of a leadership candidate should receive an annual block of high 
quality training dedicated to judgment and decision making, probabilistic 
reasoning, cognitive bias, heuristics, effective teaming, belief updating, 
and groupthink avoidance.  
• Because the performance of a leader is impossible to measure objectively, 
DHS should seek opportunities to use group performance as a proxy for 
leadership performance whenever possible. 
• Make the system for evaluating leadership candidates a blind process by 
anonymizing application materials to remove any biographic indicators. 
There is no predictive value to be found in a candidate’s name, gender, 
race, ethnicity, etc. Allowing evaluators to have access to that data is an 
invitation to unconscious cognitive errors. Prior to a final selection 
decision, officials should be judging the future performance potential of 
multiple barcodes rather than multiple people.  
• Candidates for first-line leadership positions should be evaluated based 
upon their capacity to perform the job they are competing for, rather than 
the job they currently have. Past performance only predicts future 
performance within solitary domains. Contributing to an effective team 
and leading an effective team are different outcomes, requiring different 
proficiencies. Measuring technical proficiency is easy. Easy does not 
equal effective. 
• Design performance management systems that produce meaningful data to 
potentiate learning and improvement. A feedback loop that identifies 
every employee as fully successful has no value. 
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• In order to improve the quality of the candidate pool for leadership 
positions, DHS should consider implementing a dual pipeline for 
employee promotions beyond the journeyman grade. Currently, highly 
skilled employees are incentivized to apply for leadership positions they 
may not want because the alternative is career stagnation. Similarly, 
selection officials are incentivized to choose such high performers because 
no alternative means of recognizing or rewarding them exists. Allowing 
employees the flexibility to choose between technical and leadership 
career pipelines would improve both candidate pools, and allow DHS to 
groom employees for the positions they want, rather than the positions to 
which they were relegated to apply. 
• As suggested by the JSU model imagined above, DHS should radically 
alter the way it interviews candidates for leadership positions by adopting 
a Moneyball methodology. Officials tasked with evaluating candidates 
should never have an opportunity to see or hear any candidate. Structured 
interviews should be conducted by a panel of trained interviewers whose 
sole task is the elicitation of the best possible information from the 
candidate in a valid, reliable manner. Anonymized interview transcripts 
can then be digitally distributed to trained selection officials for blind 
evaluations. Tasking one group of people with conducting and evaluating 
interviews is a recipe for poor judgment. 
• In addition to anonymizing all selection packets to remove biographic 
information, the packets for every candidate should also be chunked into 
logical portions and randomized prior to evaluation. Chunking will 
mitigate the halo effect, or the unconscious tendency for positive or 
negative impressions formed by a rater in one area to unjustly influence 
the rating of an unrelated area.  
• Use multiple selection tools to evaluate the performance potential of 
leadership candidates. Combining multiple forecasts increases predictive 
96 
accuracy. Selection processes that only use one or two data sources (e.g., 
resume and interview) are inherently less accurate than those using 
multiple data sources.  
• Incorporate standardized GCA testing into the leadership selection 
process. GCA is the most reliable predictor of future workplace 
performance for all job types, and should be used more broadly by DHS to 
narrow candidate pools. 
2. Improving Organizational Judgment and Decision Making 
• Design a formal curriculum for the DHS leadership cadre dedicated to 
improving JDM. Research demonstrates that even modest periodic 
training investments dedicated to probabilistic reasoning, bias mitigation, 
belief updating, active open mindedness, post-mortem analysis, and 
groupthink avoidance can pay significant returns. JDM training should be 
included in the onboarding curriculum for new leaders, incorporated into 
mandatory annual training requirements for existing leaders, and made 
digitally available for all employees via the DHS intranet. At a minimum, 
every DHS leader should be familiar with the findings of Tversky, 
Kahneman, and Tetlock. 
• Task the DHS Chief Learning and Engagement Officer with the creation 
of a JDM intranet resource page populated with best examples of video 
lectures, articles, research, books, and other digital media related to the 
topic. Seeking partnership with a leading academic institution, such as the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School to assist in the effort, would 
be a reasonable first step.  
• Understand the difference between complex and complicated problem 
spaces as a means of discerning the optimal path to a solution. If the 
relationship between cause and effect is observable and replicable, then 
using a diverse group to discern a solution is inefficient. In such cases, 
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machines or experts would produce better outcomes. Conversely, if a 
problem space is unpredictable such that the relationships between cause 
and effect are not tightly bound, then diversity will outperform expertise. 
• Be wary of labels. Too often, people are anointed with the title of expert 
simply because they have been working in a particular field for a long 
period of time. Experience and expertise are not the same thing. Poor 
long-term performance is evidence of ignorance, not aptitude. 
• Understand the systemic reasons why groups of complex problem solvers 
succeed or fail. Groups can work collaboratively to produce judgments 
which are more accurate than the best estimate of any single member, but 
only under specific conditions. Diversity, training, feedback, individual 
accountability, recognition, and algorithms are critical components for 
effective crowdsourcing because of their collective capacity to filter static, 
amplify signal, and progressively improve over time. Conversely, groups 
of otherwise incomparably intelligent problem solvers can produce 
judgments which are worse than those of any single member if they are 
left untrained, unaccountable, homogenous, consensus driven, and without 
effective feedback. When randomly wrong becomes consistently wrong, 
aggregating and averaging does not filter out the static; it amplifies it, 
thereby obscuring signal fidelity. A group that cannot learn from its 
mistakes is going to repeat them. 
• DHS should refine the way it conceptualizes diversity. If pressed, many 
who insist that diverse groups are better than homogenous groups 
probably could not explain why, because touting diversity is a socially 
acceptable thing to do. Diversity is not a polite abstraction; it is a silver 
bullet. Diversity is a tangible, game changing force that can radically 
improve the performance of a group in the same way that a fulcrum can 
radically improve the performance of a lever. In order to function 
optimally a group needs to be cognitively diverse, yet most organizations 
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strive for biographic diversity; a myopic perspective that hampers 
potential. Biographic diversity is a valid path to cognitive diversity, but 
there are others. When forming groups to work in complex problem 
spaces, DHS should strive for cognitive diversity.  
• Task the DHS Office of Science and Technology with implementing a 
secure intranet platform modeled after GitHub to enable enterprise-wide 
collaboration and idea sharing. DHS has an ever-changing range of 
complex challenges to navigate. It also has a large, talented, diverse 
workforce, tailor-made for developing innovative solutions. What the 
department lacks is a dedicated space to apply its people to its problems 
by harnessing the power of crowdsourcing and social recognition. It 
should be a meritocratic environment where identities are transparent, 
titles are irrelevant, and ideas are elevated via peer-ratings and feedback 
based solely on the quality of the contribution. Any DHS employee could 
use the site as a living white board to issue challenges or offer solutions, 
which others could then critique, incorporate, modify, or ignore. Such an 
environment would also provide DHS with a valuable opportunity to 
identify unrecognized talent that could then be repurposed to better serve 
both the mission, and the employee. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Boosting Accuracy via Affinity Weighting 
If the historical data produced by every weather forecasting model throughout the 
world were analyzed to determine the accuracy of each, it seems reasonable to imagine that 
over time, some models might be found to have developed affinities for certain types of 
meteorological phenomena. For example, one model might be consistently above average 
at predicting microbursts and another might be reliably better at guessing snowstorm 
accumulations. During the IARPA tournament, Tetlock only considered the overall 
historical performance of each forecaster as a means of weighting the value of their 
subsequent prediction. It is possible that Tetlock missed an opportunity to algorithmically 
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extract a modicum of additional accuracy from his forecasters. What if, over time, human 
forecasters exhibited affinities for specific topic areas, like North American commodity 
markets or European elections? Were that true, then the value of a prediction could be 
weighted by overall performance, as well as performance within a specific domain. It is a 
testable hypothesis. 
2. Boosting Accuracy via Granularity 
Consider a counterfactual question: What fate would have befallen Surowiecki’s 
fame had Galton forced his fairgoers to guess the bulk of the beast in 50-pound intervals? 
One notable finding that emerged from GJP was that forecasters are capable of 
meaningfully distinguishing between finer degrees of uncertainty than previously believed. 
In fact, there was a strong correlation observed between the granularity of a forecaster and 
the accuracy of a forecaster. Further, Tetlock found that artificially coarsening forecasts 
after the fact by rounding to the nearest interval sacrificed signal and eroded accuracy. As 
a result, some components of the IC have considered abandoning status quo scales of 
uncertainty in favor of more granular alternatives. Given that most leadership selection 
processes use traditional 5-point Likert scales to rate various aspects of a candidate’s 
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